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“Technique is the boundary of democracy. What technique wins, democracy loses.” 
 




Jacques Ellul is one of the major names in the philosophy of technology. A member of the 
first generation of theoreticians to bring technology to the fore of philosophical and 
sociological debate, he was concerned with the changing conditions of Western society in 
the wake of industrialization, massification and rationalization. His body of work is currently 
under renewed interest by the occasion of the centenary of his birth. It sprawls from the 
analysis of the technological phenomenon, to biographical essays and interviews, to several 
contributions for dialectical theology. One of Ellul’s tenets is the preservation of the 
individual’s moral autonomy vis-à-vis an increasingly hegemonic technical rationalism that 
delegitimizes political, economic, cultural and spiritual alternatives. Technical rationalism, or 
technique, is seen as a centripetal force, gradually replacing all alternatives with the 
efficiency principle and technical expertise based decision-making. Propaganda plays a 
fundamental role in this system by conditioning the ideological content of symbolic culture, 
while also affecting the perception and use of alternative discourses within what Ellul calls 
“the technological society”. 
This paper will couple the contemporary role of propaganda with the struggle to control 
communication channels, seeking to assess whether, and to what degree, the current 
debates about the balance between freedom and security in cyberspace can be viewed as 
instances of shifts in propaganda and technological myths. I will present an overview of 
Jacques Ellul’s contribution to a critical understanding of the role of technology and 
propaganda as a starting point for exploring the colonizing and transformative effects of 
propagandistic elements in information politics. I will also introduce the main elements of 
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Ellul’s dialectical view, which presents technical phenomena as a closely knit totalizing 
system interacting with social formation, but gradually marginalizing alternatives, and 
installing in all areas of human life a set of principles that prioritize maximum efficiency. 
Ellul’s work will be presented and contrasted with other important contributions to the study 
of propaganda and technology, especially those from critical theory. 
In the first section, I will start by exploring Ellul’s conception of technique and his view on 
how propaganda is intertwined with technological discourse, particularly through the 
exploitation of the perception of threats and risks as opportunities for further technical 
rationalization. The following section will analyse other contributions to the debate on 
propaganda and mass culture, including critical media theory, contrasting them with Ellul’s 
work on the subject.  Lastly, I will present my views on how Ellul’s theory of propaganda 
systems can contribute to a critical analysis of information politics, particularly regarding the 
reframing of the role of digital networks and cyber security in the economy, politics and 
sociability.  
2. Jacques Ellul as a Critic of Modern Heteronomy 
Jacques Ellul’s (1912-1994) influence on contemporary philosophy of technology can hardly 
be overstated. He is widely acknowledged as one of the major contributors to the field, and 
his extensive body of work presents important challenges to the consequences of modernity. 
On the occasion of his centenary, his work is being revisited by scholars from different 
backgrounds in the social sciences, trying to bring into renewed focus the interlocking 
politics, technology, propaganda, as well as theology, that characterizes this French thinker’s 
writings.1 The inspiration Ellul drew from his early readings of Marx was the beginning of a 
lifelong dialogue – he taught a course on Marx’s thought in Bordeaux until the end of his 
career, besides engaging with other Marxian-influenced thinkers, the most prominent being 
Cornelius Castoriadis. The emphasis on the moral autonomy of the individual in everyday life 
and social practice is a salient shared trait, which Ellul maintained in his theological writings, 
which were influenced by the Swiss theologian Karl Barth. 
Widely regarded as a major, but controversial, contributor to a critique of industrial society 
and the technological phenomenon, Ellul is usually labelled as a conservative, anti-
technological thinker. He did indeed grapple with ideological, social and political issues 
throughout his whole life, refusing what he saw as an uncritical adherence to the generalized 
technological optimism of the 20th century. He explored technology’s ambivalent influence as 
a material and, more importantly, ideological juggernaut with pervasive effects upon the 
physical and symbolic worlds. As such, his use of the term technique points to a 
phenomenon that must not be confused with technology, since it is more akin to Weber’s 
concept of rationalization and its focus on instrumentality. For Ellul, technique’s dominion 
over society is all the more in need of critical analysis as its outputs are unanimously hailed 
as tools for human progress or emancipation – and its failings presented as human inability 
in letting technology and experts share their blessings with humanity. 
These essential points of Ellul’s work make him relevant in a time of finance-driven 
austerity, when technical expertise and technical imperatives seem to override human well-
being and social progress, and indeed to go directly against them, intensifying repression, 
rather than regulation and redistribution, in order to supress the effects of its internal 
contradictions. Ellul understood that the installation of the mythology of technique needed a 
wider apparatus of indoctrination and persuasion, in the form of systematic myth-building and 
strong training and education systems that produce trained personnel amenable to the 
workings of the technical order. Given the current powerful institutional meshing of these 
phenomena, revisiting the French thinker – without disregarding recent contributions or the 
critiques his ideas have received along the years – may contribute to shed light on the 
entrenchment of technical rationalism in our political regimes, and their capture by the 
injunctions of the economic, financial and technological realms.  
                                                
1 One of the important contributions to this on-going debate is the recent volume Jacques Ellul and the 
Technological Society in the 21st Century (Jerónimo, Garcia, and Mitcham 2013). 
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In a time when the hegemony of technique was taking root, Ellul’s originality resides in 
disputing the possibility of exclusively technological solutions to social problems, and in 
emphasising the need to prioritize well-being over the demands of technical rationalism, so 
as not to exert the extreme costs of technological change on society without compensatory 
measures that allow for the furthering of human goals (personal fulfilment, family life, cultural 
and spiritual needs, health). His work departs from a political economy analysis, an 
endeavour he sees as being concerned with an instrumental reorientation of technique and 
not as a critique of technique per se. In this regard, he rejects Hayek’s famous injunction of 
economic planning as evil (Ellul 1973a, 178), but rather alerts to, first, the double difficulty of 
prioritizing and balancing needs and, second, a “planning creep,” whereby technical 
expertise indefinitely extends its internal logic of quantification and efficiency.  
In his Preface to Le Système Technicien, Jean-Luc Porquet describes Ellul's view of 
technique in society as a determinant, ambivalent, self-perpetuating, self-reinforcing, myth-
creating, normalizing factor (Porquet 2004, 8). For Ellul, since all aspects of human activity 
are subject to technical imperatives (at odds with natural or even social factors), it does not 
remain within the individual's power to alter the direction of social, political or even economic 
matters, much less to evaluate the criteria implied in the notions of progress: “all these 
different kinds of 'progress' become feasible only to the degree that men are subjected in 
advance to the action of technique” (Ellul 1973a, 208, emphasis added). Therefore, he 
assigns little relevance to the particular political system, whether it is democratic or 
centralized in nature, or even to the property structure of the means of production. These 
constitute formal or institutional mediations for a specialized body of knowledge, converted 
by technical elites into actions directing the economic and social systems towards maximum 
efficiency, thereby tightening control over State apparatuses and communication channels.  
 
It is in the realm of economic technique that we experience most clearly the great 
and dramatic process of modern times, in which both chance and natural laws are 
transformed into decisions of accountants, rules of planning and decrees of the 
state. (...) Whether the question is one of understanding public opinion, or of 
stochastics, or of statistics as a whole, the technical starting point is always the 
human behavior of the majority. From this behavior, technique draws a number of 
consequences and modes of action, erecting on it the system into which it will 
necessarily insert itself (Ellul 1973a, 216). 
 
Herein lies the key to understanding what is “antidemocratic” in our economies. The 
“efficiency principle” of the technological system, by virtue of its universalism, extends 
beyond the economic sphere. Professionalized politics are also subject to the economy. 
Even if citizens are permitted to participate through elections and referendums, political 
systems are increasingly constrained by efficiency laws and rules that set apparently 
inexorable courses, which provide the universal epistemic paradigm for the administration of 
human affairs.2  
Technique has colonized all spheres of activity in a normative, as well as in a material 
sense (Fischer-Kowalski and Haberl 1997; Krausmann et al. 2008). Therefore, studying 
contemporary culture critically is to engage with the effects of the extension of this epistemic 
paradigm into the world of the mind. In The Technological Society, Jacques Ellul highlights 
the anti-humanistic character of the industrial system, labelling the resulting economic 
structures as “anti-democratic” (1973a, 215 ff.). Ellul's sceptical stance contrasts with 20th 
century technological politics, which welcomed technological progress as one of the paths 
towards democratization and emancipation. Opposing his Christian humanism to the 
technocratic imperatives of the industrial mode of production, Ellul argues that social controls 
of technical and political processes are, in fact, forms of legitimizing the imposition of 
industrial production norms upon worker, citizen, and consumer. Moreover, this is an 
                                                
2 Jacques Ellul did not hesitate to consider elections as a legitimizing tool for the technocratic system: as a form of 
“selection of individuals”, or even a limited set of problems and binary answers, election reduces “the problem of 
participation to its simplest form” (Ellul 1973a, 139), and disavows more direct and diverse forms of participation. 
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ateleological process. The lack of purpose, of a plan articulating means and ends, indicates 
that technique evolves through combinatorial, opportunistic tactics of self-adaptation, rather 
than a global strategy (Ellul 1973a, 97). 
K. H. Karim states that “[t]echnique is the overarching feature of contemporary western 
civilization, according to Ellul; it describes not only the modalities of technology but also the 
nature of present-day social, political and economic organization” (2001, 116). The 
individual's social role is bestowed on him through several mechanisms. The specific 
contents of the messages that circulate and “are reproduced” are determined by context and 
history, but also by the more straightforward logic of necessity. According to Ellul, the 
particular forms of that logic are a direct result of the structuring of means and ends brought 
about by technique.  
Drawing together technology, culture and society, the industrial “economic imperative” 
appears as a major guiding force of social attitudes towards technique. Its problematic 
spread to all areas of social life can also be identified in Illich's notion of “industrial 
methodology” (1972), which brings the Ellulian concept of technique into a more concrete 
shape. According to Illich, most major modern institutions – education, health, army, roads or 
communication systems – are modelled after the factory. Their real aim is to maximize the 
efficiency of energy use, in order to provide the industrial structure with all the means 
necessary for its maintenance and expansion – including the adherence of individuals (Illich 
1973; 1974). This technocratic overruling of all other social concerns systematically reduces 
the individual to the predictable and pliable consumer and/or citizen, aided by the increasing 
sophistication of political communication techniques, as exposed by early practitioners 
(Packard 1962). The role of propaganda is, for Ellul, that of a “human technique” – 
techniques for reshaping behaviour and beliefs in order to adapt human beings to the 
conditions imposed by the continual restructuring of the life world through technique. As 
such, it is a necessary part of the technical system (1973a, 394; Porquet 2004).  
As C. Christians puts it, “[t]he issue is the psychopolitical imaginary universe which 
humans constitute and reinforce” (1995, 166). In this regard, propaganda has an essential 
role to play in the organization of modern life. Not only does propaganda contribute to 
maintaining the technical system by ensuring an efficient, continuous flow of information), but 
it also conditions audiences through the mobilization of symbols and practices, charging 
them with the hegemonic contents of the technical system. One of the main concerns in 
Ellul's work is the perceived devaluing of life’s material and spiritual dimension by 
propaganda, skewing them towards the values of technique. This concern is directly tied to 
his perception of the ascent of systematic propaganda in modern society, as we shall see in 
the following section. 
3. Propaganda, Democracy and Economy 
The word “propaganda” acquired much of its current sense during the Catholic Counter 
Reformation movement, with the establishment in 1622, by Pope Gregory XV, of the Sacra 
Congregatio Propaganda Fide. As a strategy for countering the Reformation movement in 
Europe, as well as spreading the Catholic faith in the newly accessible parts of the world, it 
created the basis for systematizing opinion control. “Propaganda” became a term for the 
organization in charge of that task, it developed to describe the “doctrine itself” and then “to 
mean the techniques employed to change opinions and spread the doctrine” (Jowett and 
O’Donnell 2012, 75). Mythology, currency, writing, sculpture, inscription, architecture, poetry, 
all were deftly used as vehicles for the instrumental shaping of culture by Greek city states, 
by Hellenistic rulers and Roman emperors, European monarchs, religious leaders and 
proselytizers, as well as revolutionary pamphleteers. Throughout history, then, “propaganda 
is an instrument to be used by those who want to secure or retain power just as much as it is 
by those wanting to displace them,” as Philip M. Taylor argues (2003, 5). 
After an overview of the emergence of modern propaganda and its relation to social 
mobilization, this section will focus on scholarship of propaganda, especially as a specific 
modern phenomenon in which the links between politics, economy, culture and the media 
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come into focus. The section will briefly summarize some of the most important contributions 
to the theorization of the phenomenon. I will then present and contrast Ellul’s own theory of 
propaganda. 
3.1. The World Wars and the Rise of Propaganda 
The history of propaganda studies is enmeshed with communication studies. The role of the 
telegram on the not-so candid newspaper reporting during the Crimean War (1853-56) and 
the emergence of mass media brought to governments' attention the need to establish 
controls over the published and the public opinions. By the end of the 19th century, the press 
had reached the peak of its influence over minds and politics, which presented a strong 
argument for controlling news items – albeit in varying dosages in peace and in wartime. The 
advent of 20th century's mass communication technologies (radio, cinema, television) 
furthered this trend. 
Propaganda achieved a very high degree of sophistication during the two world wars, 
pursuing the same objectives of mobilization, control and demoralization of previous 
centuries with more powerful technical means. The intensity of propaganda deployment, 
particularly in Europe after World War I, underlined the urgency of its study as an intentional 
and systematic form of persuasion, first, in the large-scale forms seen during the conflict 
(Curnalia 2005, 238), and, later, as a more generalized management methodology for social 
belief-systems. Ellul dated the rise of modern propaganda to World War I (still “incoherent 
and temporary”) and the Revolution of 1917, when propaganda became “systematic and 
enduring” (1976a, 104, translated from the French edition).  
The World Wars mark important turning points in the history of propaganda. During World 
War I, previous experiences were expanded and intensified to take advantage of mass 
communication systems (especially the press and motion pictures). The contenders 
mobilized and developed advertising industries, created committees and other special 
initiatives to put together a massive organization with the aims of garnering internal support, 
influencing neutral positions, and of denigrating, demoralizing and attacking the enemy.3  
Anti-war positions were systematically condemned and downplayed as part of the war effort 
on the “home front,” something that the British propagandists used to great benefit (Jowett 
and O’Donnell 2012, 216–228; Ellul 1976a, 104–113). The latter were much more organized 
and better prepared (through secret bodies such as the Wellington House war propaganda 
bureau) than their German counterparts, who were mainly focused on military morale and in 
dismissing enemy propaganda as lies and immoral attacks. Atrocity propaganda was a 
preeminent feature of this period but, again, the British gained advantage after the sinking of 
the liner Lusitania in 1915 by a German U-boat, when more than 1.000 civilians (over 100 of 
which were Americans) perished.  
Besides the Lusitania case, the execution of Red Cross nurse Edith Cavell by the German 
army, as well as other incidents, played an important part in reinforcing pro-war attitudes in 
American public opinion and demonstrated two aspects of modern mass propaganda: the 
effectiveness of mass communication messages as psychological weapons (especially 
demonization tactics and atrocity propaganda) and the value of a professionally organized 
war propaganda machine. The United States set up its war propaganda efforts around the 
Committee on Public Information (CPI), directed by the journalist George Creel. One of the 
priorities was “converting” the internal audience to President Woodrow Wilson’s idea of a 
civilizational “war to end all wars.” The CPI’s work enlisted advertising companies, the film 
industry and the press to such an efficient degree that it began to raise concerns about the 
future of democracy and individual freedom. The role of propaganda had been well 
established: in the face of total war at a global scale, popular support and morale were to be 
managed in order to mobilize maximum acquiescence, productivity and efficiency for the war 
effort. 
                                                
3 The physical disruption of direct communication lines (submarine cables) between Germany and the United 
States by the British also played a part in World War I, severing important diplomatic and commercial links (Taylor 
2003, 177). 
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During World War II, propaganda had a new instrument at its disposal. Radio had been 
tested earlier during the interwar period by fascists (such as Mussolini) and democrats 
(Roosevelt’s fireside chats, for example), and it quickly became a mass communication 
medium. Nazi propaganda, led by Joseph Goebbels, used mass media and Albert Speer’s 
spectacles to strengthen internal support and, later commenters would add, reshape the 
disposition of the citizens with lasting effects. In fact, Hitler and Goebbels put in place a 
systematic exploitation of predominant psychological and social conditions created by the 
defeat in World War I, sustained by a deep understanding of effective communication with 
the masses: radio, newspapers, leaflets, architecture, rallies; all were used to gain a tight 
control over domestic conditions. Early victories of Nazi Germany – the Anschluss, the 
Sudetenland plebiscite and the annexation of Czechoslovakia – were preceded by intense 
campaigns which made possible the enthusiastic support of German speakers in those 
areas. British and American propaganda institutions, as had been the case during the Great 
War, deployed various propaganda strategies to maintain morale, establish a unified “home 
front,” get support abroad, and demoralize the enemy – carefully balancing truth and 
disinformation, according to the specific purpose. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor 
in December 1941, the United States rallied behind President Roosevelt and his radio-
transmitted voice. Later into the war, the Office of War Information (1943) was established to 
coordinate domestic propaganda and strengthen the commitment of the American mass 
communication and entertainment industry. Other contenders in the war – the Soviet Union 
and Japan – had also developed their own propaganda machines. The former had done so 
in the wake of the October Revolution, pressed by the need to quickly acquire a strong social 
basis of support, while the Japanese propaganda apparatus implemented modern 
techniques after being confronted with hostile propaganda during its invasion of China and 
the Pacific islands. 
In the period after the wars, propaganda’s role persisted, and even intensified with the 
Cold War, drawing on the lessons of the highly effective use of new techniques and media in 
the first half of the century. Wars raged around the globe, enacting the global drama at local 
scales (Korea and Vietnam, for instance) and, for the whole world, in yet another new 
medium - television. Propaganda techniques developed alongside consumerism, morphing 
into the highly successful promotional sector. The war effort was the crucial purpose of 
wartime propaganda and psychological warfare; however, peace time advertising was a 
different form of persuasion and mobilization, also aimed at a permanent conditioning 
embedded in mass culture, though without propaganda’s bad reputation (inherited from State 
wartime propaganda) as a form of aggressive, warmongering manipulation. Advertising, 
marketing, and public relations developed tools to allure the population to participate in 
economic activity as a way of life (both as worker and as a consumer) and to engage in the 
ideological battle between western capitalism and soviet socialism.  
3.2. Propaganda Studies and Models 
The development of propaganda apparatuses and techniques did not cease during 
peacetime, and in fact proved expedient for economic, political or ideological purposes 
beyond armed conflict. As stated above, the sophistication of propaganda apparatuses 
merited immediate suspicion on the part of the press and scholars in the United Kingdom 
and the USA, who feared for the independence of the press and individual reasoning under 
the pressure of emotional and social symbolic manipulation. 
Early studies on propaganda were developed by the same experts who had participated in 
the war effort and developed the apparatuses of modern state propaganda. After the Great 
War, authors such as Creel, Lasswell, Lippman or Bernays tackled the phenomenon as an 
integral part of contemporary public communication. In doing so, they launched the basis for 
communication studies. The first of these four authors retold, in 1920, his experience as 
head of the Committee on Public Information and acknowledged the role he had played in 
influencing domestic and foreign public opinion. Stern warnings about the effects of the new 
dependency on propaganda were also issued by Harold Lasswell, who, in his work 
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Propaganda Technique in the World War (1927), considered that the instrumentalization of 
mass media by propaganda had direct effects on the individuals, creating homogeneous 
behaviours and beliefs promoted by the messages being spread. Lasswell viewed 
propaganda as a tool for emotional manipulation that could be deployed to change attitudes 
and behaviour. The same concern about mass media power over public opinion had been 
voiced by Walter Lippmann in Public Opinion (1922), as advertising techniques started to 
develop. While these authors mainly focused on media effects, they shared the view that the 
coupling of psychological techniques with mass media technologies created a strong force 
that served the interests of whatever masters happened to wield it, with the potential to make 
political communication more efficient in mass democracy.  
Edward Bernays extolled propaganda as a necessity of modern society: it is the means for 
the elite – business leaders, politicians, and the state – to keep mass society under control. 
The context and methods, the quality and objects of propaganda may change, but not its 
function. The closing paragraph of his book Propaganda reads: “[i]ntelligent men must realize 
that propaganda is the modern instrument by which they can fight for productive ends and 
help to bring order out of chaos” (Bernays 1928, 159). This instrumental view of propaganda 
and the inevitability of its effects led to a comprehensive analysis of political economy 
factors; instead, it focused on the behavioural effectiveness of massive campaigns and the 
potentials of new (quasi-scientific) techniques. 
One of the first models of propaganda addressed the deepening links between economy, 
culture, politics and advertising by looking into the linguistic and rhetorical properties of the 
messages. It was developed in the interwar period by the scholars of the Institute for 
Propaganda Analysis (IPA) of Columbia University and published in “How to Detect 
Propaganda” (1937) as part of a series of materials for raising awareness of propaganda 
techniques and educating for its detection in national and foreign materials. It detailed seven 
distinguishing aspects of the content of propaganda messages that could be used as the 
basis for simple analytical work. These were, in fact, common language “tricks” to which 
propagandists resorted and could be detected by anyone in a given text: “name-calling,” 
“generality,” “transfer,” “testimonial,” “plain folks,” “card stacking,” and “band wagon” (Jowett 
and O’Donnell 2012, 237).4 This approach retained the idea that emotional manipulation was 
the core of propaganda. This model did not take into account crucial aspects of 
institutionalized propaganda, such as production or reception, but had the definite advantage 
of the simplicity of its approach. 
Yet, the increasing sophistication of propaganda systems was very hard to capture in 
such simple models. The IPA did not survive the onset of World War II, finding it impossible 
to pursue its program of content analysis in the face of the mobilization of public opinion for 
the war. The history of critical theory is also linked to the turmoil of the war years: the 
founding members of this intellectual movement were forced into exile in the United States 
as the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt came under attack after 1933. Adorno, 
Horkheimer and Marcuse were among the intellectuals engaged in the critical assessment of 
contemporary culture and its transformation through the emergence of mass media.  
Critical theorists did not hold mass culture in high regard. Perhaps with the exception of 
Walter Benjamin, they maintained a sceptic position about the possibility of critical 
emancipation in the context of mass culture, or rather “the culture industry.” In Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, Horkheimer and Adorno analysed the culture industry as a generator of false 
social consensus and one of the sources of the hegemony of instrumental logic. The 
consequences of its workings were dire: alienation, loss of critical reasoning, atrophy of 
                                                
4 “Name calling” is the process by which an idea or person is given a bad name in order to discredit it without 
rational examination. “Glittering generality” refers to the association of an idea to a second idea or word in order to 
assign an intended character – positive or negative. “Transfer” consists in the positive or negative association of 
respect commanded by something to another idea. “Testimonial” is the process by which a loved or hated person 
conveys the message that an idea is good or bad. “Plain folks” is a method of identification between a speaker 
and the audience by stating that the former is a common person. “Card stacking” consists in selecting facts, 
examples or other statements in order to convey the intended message. “Bandwagon” refers to a form of 
persuasion based on the argument of generalized social acceptance. 
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imagination and spontaneity, mediocrity, maintenance of the status quo and the promotion of 
novelty for its own sake. The culture industry and mass media linked social uniformity 
(conformity) to economic necessity: “freedom to choose and ideology, which always reflects 
economic coercion, everywhere proves to be freedom to be the same” (Horkheimer and 
Adorno 2002, 135–136). This was, in short, an expression of the economic and political 
power of the elites under the guise of choice and technological reason.  
Propaganda was an integral part of this system, incessantly conveying messages to be 
enjoyed uncritically as mass entertainment or amusement. Messages were to be converted 
into beliefs and behaviours, encouraging and reinforcing adaptation to this system of 
technical instrumentality. Their existence was essential, because to be outside the margins 
of this quantified, categorized society is to be unable to participate in it. Advertising lost its 
social informative role to “strengthen the bond which shackles consumers to the big 
combines” (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002, 131), a pervasive phenomenon that feeds back 
into the monopolistic logic of large organizations. Perversely, the “consumers of cultural 
commodities” are aware of the manipulative or false character of culture industry goods, but 
they do not seem to have a choice beyond integration with “compulsive imitation” 
(Horkheimer and Adorno 2002, 136). This false consciousness protected this crypto-
totalitarian system of its dialectical counterpart, which was to be supplied by critical theory 
itself. 
Critical theorists also shared a critical view of contemporary technology, and both 
Horkheimer and Marcuse linked it to forms of domination that monopolized the positive 
potential of modern technology and closed off its affordances except insofar as it might be 
profitable or advantageous to partially distribute them. “[T]he basis on which technology is 
gaining power over society is the power of those whose economic position in society is 
strongest. Technical rationality today is the rationality of domination,” which replaces 
objective reason with subjective interests (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002, 96). In this way, it is 
diverted into instrumental reason: “[h]aving given up autonomy, reason has become an 
instrument. […] completely harnessed to the social process. Its operational value, its role in 
the domination of men and nature, has been made the sole criterion” (Horkheimer 2004, 14–
15). In order to reclaim technology, it would have to be reinstated into a rational and positive 
realm of progress. 
Marcuse in his One-Dimensional Man (1964) demonstrates a concern similar to Jacques 
Ellul’s regarding the phenomenon of technical thinking and its effects on modern life, trying to 
unravel the “compulsive” character of integration in the mass society. The famous indictment 
of capitalist socio-technological systems as opposed to democratic freedom echoed the 
words of Ellul in this article’s epigraph: advanced industrialism has installed a self-sustaining 
ideology of instrumental rationality that runs contrary to democratic freedom. Marcuse 
criticized the “exploitative features” of centralized technical direction, especially in its 
negative effects on self-determination, meaning its potential for the reduction of the exercise 
of autonomous reason in the confrontation with the hegemony of technical rationality 
(Marcuse 1964, 253). However, even as he warned against technological fetishism and false 
needs that generate a false freedom in a passive audience, Marcuse exalted the 
emancipatory potential of technological rationality to eliminate scarcity and the struggle 
between man and nature, as well as to provide spiritual and aesthetic fulfilment, that is, to 
answer true human needs. Therefore, he did not entirely despair of modern technology, 
highlighting its potential for the pacification of existence, or “pacified existence” (Marcuse 
1964, 235).   
Kellner (1984, 264-265) argues that, for Marcuse “the problem in advanced capitalist 
society is not that people are enslaved by technology, but that it functions in many instances 
as an instrument of class domination”, which contradicts the emancipatory deployment of 
technology. Both Horkheimer and Marcuse stressed that the specific organization of 
productive forces in capitalism restricted most of the social benefits of modern, industrial 
“technological rationality” (characterized by scientific and technological progress, efficiency 
and mechanization) by supplanting it with “capitalist rationality” (predicated upon private 
property and the maximization of profitability) and gradually restraining self-determination 
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and freedom (Marcuse 2004, 44–45). Unlike Ellul, Marcuse did not entirely oppose industrial 
technology, but its implementation under capitalism. In fact, he looked past contemporary 
industrialist exploitation and the struggle for the conditions of existence, towards a 
communist ideal of human fulfilment, that is, true freedom. Changing the political character of 
industrialism would be an integral part of that transition. That would entail replacing 
instrumental reason and driving out the false needs that perpetuate the economic and social 
structure of domination of capitalistic industrialism. In this sense, the author assigned 
technology a most important role in bringing about the end of history as a struggle, through 
emancipation from want and suffering by way of a democratic, humanistic implementation 
and governance.  
An important part of Marcuse’s work on propaganda focused precisely on how national-
socialism mastered it for the purposes of domination and indoctrination. Marcuse specified, 
in State and Individual under National Socialism, that it “tends toward direct and immediate 
self-government by the prevailing social groups over the rest of the population. And it 
manipulates the masses by unleashing the most brutal and selfish instincts of the individual” 
(Marcuse 2004, 70). In The New German Mentality, the author highlighted the effectiveness 
of propaganda in the shaping and mobilization of the minds of German people precisely in 
order to serve the expansionist, predatory industrial capitalism of the dominant groups and 
businesses.  
For Marcuse, who studied German propaganda during the war, Hitler and Goebbels 
“changed the thought and behaviour pattern of the German people” (2004, 141). Marcuse 
posited two layers in this new mentality: a pragmatic and mythological layer. The first 
included the efficiency principle, mechanization and rationalization, while the second fostered 
paganism, racism and vitalism (Marcuse 2004, 141–142). This coupling of technical 
rationality with a highly regimented political and social life resulted in a complete domination 
of the social sphere and strangled any progressive alternatives. It marked a new stage in the 
submission of the work force and all creative energies to industrial efficiency and the dictates 
of the totalitarian state: “[i]ntegral politicalization is the National Socialist concomitant of the 
transition to a planned economy within the established social framework; integral debunking, 
cynical matter-of-factness and the shifting of traditional taboos are the German features of 
technological rationality, and neo-paganism serves to crush the psychological and emotional 
resistance to ruthless imperialist conquest” (Marcuse 2004, 146).  
Marcuse concluded that efforts to reverse that change risked faced great difficulties, given 
how ingrained the new ideology had become on the collective psyche by way of 
regimentation, fear-mongering and linguistic manipulation. Accordingly, his analysis stressed 
the enduring social, cultural and ideological effects of propaganda, in the context of a project 
for a radical change of mentality. According to Marcuse, the success of Nazi propaganda can 
be attributed to the effective use of new media (radio, in particular) but also, more 
importantly, to an effort to completely reshape beliefs and forms of thinking. This prompted 
him to outline new methods and a new language to counter the effects of a decade of Nazi 
domination – a language of facts, recollection and re-education (Marcuse 2004, 165). Allied 
counter-propaganda would need to address the specific changes undertaken by German 
mentality: it had to be pragmatic (about facts, power and efficiency, and not ideology) and 
objective-oriented (the defeat of Nazism, and not of Germany). At the same time, Marcuse 
warned that it would be essential to show the links between Nazi imperialism and Nazi “big 
business” in order to demonstrate that the war reinforced their vested interests (Marcuse 
2004, 177). Counter-propaganda would also need to bring out and foster redeeming forces, 
symbols and ideas not appropriated, discarded or destroyed by the totalitarian grip.  
Herbert Marcuse demonstrated the power of propaganda in the regimentation of political 
discourse and thought, a drive that produced irrationality out of a highly rationalized 
organization aimed at domination. Insofar as it maintains its hold over the symbolic, 
propaganda cannot be deconstructed except by way of another instrumentalization of 
communication able to reinstall autonomy. In Habermas we find a refined notion of the value 
of the public exercise of reason in the public sphere, where discourse, rationality, and the 
specific conditions for social and political communication come into focus as the basis for 
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freedom and equality in modern societies (Habermas 1962). Habermas shares with Ellul an 
insistence in the autonomy of individual conscience in its relation with morality. For 
Habermas, the normative colonization of the “public sphere,” first by the early mass media, 
and then by the professional cohorts of propagandists and promotional experts, presented a 
serious threat – or, at least, a “strange element” – to its independence from political 
institutions (Silva 2002, 59). Media hegemony and the corresponding commodification and 
massification created serious limits to autonomous political reasoning, especially since 
internal democracy and independence of the media receded into secondary matters. 
“Scientization” conditioned public communication, transforming most of it into a commercial 
venture more concerned with its own performance than with its social role (Habermas 
1989a). 
Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda model (HC), laid out in Manufacturing Consent 
(1988), remains a powerful framework understanding how changes in the public sphere 
reflect the political economy of capitalist societies. By focusing on the organization and 
structure of the media – particularly their sources of funding – and not on their effects or the 
contents of media products, this model proposes a systemic view of propaganda as it 
develops in a specific media environment. The model aims to present a better 
comprehension of the workings of the media system in capitalist societies, reflecting the 
persistence of inequalities of influence, capital and power that affect the general outlook of 
public communication. The model presents five “filters” that determine how commercial 
media “filter out the news fit to print, marginalize dissent, and allow the government and 
private interests to get their messages across to the public” (Herman and Chomsky 2002, 2), 
namely: (1) size or ownership of the dominant mass media firms; (2) sources of income, 
particularly advertising; (3) sources of information used by the media, particularly regarding 
their reliance on “information provided by government, business, and ‘experts’ funded and 
approved” by them (Herman and Chomsky 2002, 2); (4) “flak”, or responses to media content 
that feed back into its content as self-censorship; and (5) originally “anticommunism”, 
following the Cold War logic, replaced with “faith in the market” (Herman 1996; 2000) or “the 
provision of an Enemy or the Face of Evil” (Herman, Chomsky, and Mullen 2009, 14). These 
five filters produce a consistent bias which is favourable to institutional allies and to corporate 
interests. 
Since the original publication of Manufacturing Consent, this model has been updated, 
tested and extended in order to reply to criticism and address historical changes (Sparks 
2007; Klaehn 2009; Mullen and Klaehn 2010). For the authors, “the changes in politics and 
communication over the past dozen years have tended on balance to enhance the 
applicability of the propaganda model” (Herman and Chomsky 2002, xvii). The trends of 
media concentration, growth of multinational conglomerates and globalization have altered 
the global communication landscape. The global media system is more similar than ever to 
the American model that served as the basis for the HC model and its original case studies. 
Even the hopes for the organization of the proletarian class that produces media content, 
especially journalists (Sparks 2007, 83), seem to be misplaced, as companies answer the 
haemorrhage of advertising income with layoffs and de-professionalization. It is not without 
reason that Gerald Sussman evaluates the current outlook as a failure of the political process 
to limit the “corporate takeover of civil society and the mediation of social and personal 
interaction by advertising” (2011, 7).5 In fact, the political sphere itself seems to have been 
colonized by multinational corporate interests to a very high degree. If, as Herman explains, 
the power of propaganda stems from the coordination of an elite, then the global reach of 
that “elite consensus” of the group of owners of private media translates into generalized 
constraints to public debate, even as the global reach of the digital media seemed to promise 
                                                
5 Gerald Sussman links the “growing commodification of public and professional life” (2011, 16) to a twofold 
operation of public communication. On the one hand, propaganda as “highly organized doctrinal texts 
communicated throughout the sound and visual media in the service of state and corporate interests (and aspiring 
elite)” On the other hand, promotion, that is, “the regular employment of advertising, marketing, direct marketing, 
public relations, and other selling initiatives on behalf of both elites and non-elites by those trained as active 
promotional and self-promotional agents” (Sussman 2011, 1). 
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the exact opposite (2000, 104; Sparks 2007, 72–73; Herman, Chomsky, and Mullen 2009, 
12).  
The H/C model, by combining institutional analysis, political economy, elite theory and 
social critical theory, offers a robust tool to understand, both at the local and global levels, 
the flow of influence, power and capital through the media system. The HC/ propaganda 
model places a great deal more emphasis on the power of capitalist elites and media 
corporations than on the audience. In the light of the history of propaganda, that is justified, 
but must be tempered with an additional concern with changing contexts and changing 
needs – even if those needs are false and artificial, as Marcuse remarked.  
Another model for the analysis of propaganda was presented by Jowett and O’Donnell 
(1986). It focused less on the workings of mass media systems, in that it contained several 
dimensions, modelled at a higher level than the HC theory. It presented “propagandistic 
communication as a process within a social system” (Jowett and O’Donnell 2012, 359). The 
model’s axis was institutional, although it included, as parts of the process of message flow, 
the social historical context, a “cultural rim” (government, ideology, events, myths, social 
practices, economy), the institution that initiates the message, propaganda agents who “send 
out ideology” for an institution through the media, media methods (technologies and 
techniques), the social network (opinion leaders, gatekeepers) and, finally, the public, either 
in general or as a specific segment of the audience (Jowett and O’Donnell 2012, 359–366).  
In this model, propaganda and culture are affected by each other in a lasting manner, but 
there is a strong dynamic quality (or meta-stability) to be found in the combination of the 
elements. This model places the most emphasis on the social-historical background. The 
operation of propaganda is a complex process that reflects the particular state of a dynamic 
system and, therefore, it is clear that major changes in media methods (such as new media 
or even new regulation) will ripple across the other elements. As the authors demonstrated in 
the case studies presented in the latest edition of Propaganda and Persuasion (including the 
analysis of tobacco and pharmaceutical companies propaganda campaigns, and the 
preparation of the invasion of Iraq in 2003), as the main elements are addressed a clear 
picture of the particular workings of propaganda campaigns begins to appear – a complex 
interweaving of symbolic, ideological and material aspects wielded by all participating actors, 
to varying degrees of efficiency (Jowett and O’Donnell 2012, 289–306). According to this 
view, all components need to be favourably mobilized in order for propaganda to succeed. 
Later, post-modernist critiques of propaganda, such as Baudrillard's, address it in all its 
forms as defining public communication practices in contemporary societies (Baudrillard 
1978; 1996; Merrin 2008). At the same time, they took a critical stance regarding the political 
economy of industrial (and post-industrial) societies, continuing the work of the Frankfurt 
School and later theorists (most importantly, the influential work of Herman and Chomsky 
cited above). Baudrillard considered that the pervasiveness of mass communication 
conceals propaganda's effectiveness while taking advantage of it: persuaders do not create 
from scratch. They explore society's ideological constructs from a centralized (and only 
superficially pluralistic) power structure, even if in the process they become devoid of 
referential value (Baudrillard 1988, 141).  
A common perspective arises from 20th century propaganda studies, which is also present 
in Jacques Ellul’s work: persuasion is nearly always opaque. It is widespread and 
irrespective of specific institutional settings or political systems, though it requires a definite 
effort to adapt it to the existing conditions. Below I will detail Ellul’s approach to propaganda 
as interplay between the requirements of modern existence and the mobilization of 
individuals in mass society. 
3.3. Propaganda in Ellul’s Theory 
Already powerful professional tools of economic and political planning by the time Ellul first 
published The Technological Society, the “techniques of manipulation” steadily gained 
prominence throughout the 20th century and the first decade of the 21st. The early scholarly 
efforts just described gave way to more solid studies based on critical approaches, 
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fundamentally changing the understanding of communication in our society. Ellul turned his 
attention to propaganda at a time when its systematization was advancing rapidly, stressing 
its changing character according to specific social and political contexts (Ellul 1962; 1976a; 
2010). Today, as information security and digital communication emerge as major global 
concerns (Taylor 2003; Macdonald 2006), public and political discourse is colonised by the 
continuing conversion of technological norms into law facilitated by a new form of “disaster 
propaganda” that focuses on the risks of digital communication networks. Before examining 
this phenomenon in closer detail, I will explore Jacques Ellul’s contribution to the study of 
propaganda and its character as a social phenomenon, in order to put forward a 
comprehensive systemic view of its practical effects on modern society. 
Propaganda is not just about lies and wrongful persuasion. According to Kenneth Payne, 
it “is a conscious act of construction, bringing the discipline within the ambit of psychology 
and anthropology. The successful propagandist has grounded their message in the narrative 
elements most likely to resonate with the target groups” (2009, 110). Propaganda influences 
opinions, attitudes and applies continuous reinforcement by saturating public communication 
with calibrated messages, in order to establish their relevance through the differentials that 
characterise specific symbolic cultures. The techniques of manipulation engage with and 
adapt to their target's culture with the purpose of focusing and orienting large numbers of 
people towards economic, political, and military goals.  
Ellul’s analysis of propaganda was thorough, and although it may be outdated in some 
respects, in others, such as the specific dialectical aspects of institutional propaganda and 
social communication, he went beyond other theorists. His characterization comprised 
several dimensions which together shed some light on the basis for its effectiveness. Among 
the external characteristics, Ellul lists as targets both “the individual and the masses” (1973b, 
6). Here, the mass consists of a body of individuals with similar characteristics or profiles 
(which is simultaneously a sociological condition for the existence of propaganda). 
Propaganda therefore takes advantage of mass communication (another sociological 
precondition) to reach segmented audiences – individuals who are alone together.  
Since propaganda must employ all available means and exploit all available resources 
(language, emotion, reason, images, myth, and objective conditions such as a certain 
standard of living, average culture and information, or ideology), as well as achieve efficiency 
in the suitability of means and ends, it must be “total” and “well-orchestrated” (Ellul 1973b, 
12–13). Thus, propaganda reconstructs reality from within, both aesthetically (as Adorno and 
Horkheimer feared) and historically, through a mesh of truth, tradition, myth, misinformation, 
rumour, lies or opinion (the formation of a homogenous public opinion in a mass society is an 
essential feature of the propaganda system for Ellul).6 For that to happen, propaganda also 
needs to be continuous, so it is not perceived as such. It overcomes resistance by 
overwhelming the individual to the point that it becomes an uncontested part of his world – 
which is why electoral propaganda is so much more noticeable than the promotional 
materials that saturate our everyday life. Another external feature is its institutional character: 
propaganda acts through organizations and propagandists (professionals) that ensure 
continuity and totality at different social levels. Propaganda is orthopraxie. Its objective is not 
to “change ideas, but to provoke an action. It is also not to make one change his allegiance 
to a given doctrine, but to irrationally engage him in an active process” (Ellul 1962, 36–37, 
emphasis added).7 The individual undertakes the action predicted by the propagandist, in an 
efficient and economical fashion. His intellectual adherence is unnecessary (although myth is 
useful), since all considerations are embedded by the propagandist in the message 
conveyed to his object. The action is defined a priori and the correct technique is 
                                                
6 It should be noted that Ellul did not think that anyone could be free from the effects of propaganda. Repetition 
and saturation would, in the end, condition all members of an audience by providing them with consistently false 
or incomplete information. For example, as a Marxist sympathiser, he was deeply affected by Krushchev’s 
revelations about the Stalinist period. For Ellul, as later for Herman and Chomsky, being informed is not the same 
as having complete knowledge, and an elitist attitude towards mass communication is an ineffective defence 
against false consciousness.  
7 Translated from the French edition. 
tripleC 12(1): 169-201, 2014 181 
CC: Creative Commons License, 2014. 
implemented, materializing a functional separation between thought and action – behavioural 
“conditioning” – in contemporary society (Ellul 1962, 39). As Bernays had previously 
suggested, thought would be an exclusive of specialized elites, and action would be all that 
remained for the masses, given the sophistication of persuasive techniques and the 
efficiency of mass communication.  
The internal characteristics of propaganda included the “knowledge of the psychological 
terrain” (Ellul 1973b, 33), with the purpose of making use of the psychological conditions of 
the target audience (in individuals and in society as a whole) to the extent needed to prompt 
the desired attitude in a given time frame (while the conditions are favourable for the desired 
outcome). For Ellul, the propagandist has to establish a form of creative continuity in order to 
utilize current opinion and beliefs. To contradict them would be to elicit an attitudinal negation 
that is entirely contrary to the tenets of propaganda. Above all, it is necessary to exploit, as 
resources, the current state of the audience, employing techniques such as those detailed by 
the IPA to maintain a certain degree of narrative coherence. An example of this today is the 
narrative of progress and growth through innovation (which I will address below). This does 
not require social homogeneity, but rather the careful consideration of the idiosyncratic 
character of public opinion and social sentiment in a given context. This ideological outlook 
presents itself as an objective condition and pretext for propaganda, supplying themes, 
contents and arguments (Ellul 1973b, 117). The historical condition of human existence is 
another dynamic element – not only is it impossible to use the same strategies across the 
globe, it is also necessary to adapt to the changing conditions in a given society. The 
messages need to be “calibrated” (never blatantly false, but carefully controlling its conditions 
of interpretation and accuracy) according to the events and the public’s reaction. The 
individual retains some autonomy, but is clearly powerless in the face of circumstances 
(natural catastrophes, war, or political turmoil): the more interest the historical situation 
elicits, the more the individual is exposed to it. 
Ellul distinguishes several categories of propaganda. The first two are political and 
sociological propaganda. The first consists in “techniques of influence employed by a 
government a party, an administration, a pressure group, with a view to changing the 
behavior of the public” (1973b, 62). In turn, sociological propaganda is defined as “the 
penetration of an ideology by means of its sociological context” (Ellul 1973b, 63), that is, the 
conditioning of society through its circumstances, especially material conditions (economy, 
political system) generating a more diffuse set of messages. Sociological propaganda also 
promotes changes of habits, even though it comes from custom, social judgement, self-
censorship and the micro disciplinary apparatus of everyday life. As G. Sussman argues, 
“ideology is constructed through interplay between base and superstructure, between 
culture, including its residues of earlier cultural epochs, and the reflexive practices of cultural, 
social, and political economic institutions” (2012, 478). Furthermore, to the extent that mass 
media replicate and amplify general sentiment, sociological propaganda is propagated 
through the same channels, reinforcing itself and acquiring the more deliberate character of 
an ideology. In the case of “the American way of life,” for example, its concrete trappings and 
well-defined ideology makes it an ideal tool to extend influence beyond national borders 
through positive representations in the media.  
A second distinction opposes agitation propaganda and integration propagation. Agitation 
propaganda seeks to overcome a given situation, and is led by the opposition in order to 
overthrow its enemies – usually in a revolutionary situation. Integration propaganda, on the 
other hand, has an organic role: it aims at “rationalizing an existing situation, […] 
transforming unconscious actions of members of a society into consciously desired activity 
that is visible, laudable, and justified […] stabilizing the social body, at unifying and 
reinforcing it” (Ellul 1973b, 75). It is precisely because of human resistance to the modern 
way of life that technological societies require propaganda – it establishes praxis, preferably 
weeding out destabilizing, revolutionary or even excessively conservative positions. 
Following Bernays, Ellul concludes that society needs propaganda to fulfil a definite role: 
integration of the individual and the masses into the technological system. That means 
“naturalizing” modern life for everyone – a mandatory form of integration in order to survive 
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and thrive as a human being. Propaganda “provides the social glue that modernity otherwise 
tends to dissolve, but [Ellul] points out as well that propaganda also contributes to the 
alienation it exploits” (Wollaeger 2008, xiii). In a word, it fosters adjustment. Polemically, Ellul 
added: “the more comfortable, cultivated, and informed the milieu to which it is addressed, 
the better it works. Intellectuals are more sensitive than peasants to integration propaganda. 
In fact, they share the stereotypes of a society even when they are political opponents of the 
society” (1973b, 76). This statement places Ellul squarely at odds with the Frankfurt school 
by denying the intellectual any critical vantage point over the prejudices of its own society 
and subjecting it to the same affectional dispositions of everyone else. There is an important 
role even for a dissenting intellectual: voicing disagreement in our societies, while critically 
important as duty and right, seldom does little more than legitimizing the majority opinion by 
highlighting its magnanimous tolerance for dissent, since ideological critique is scrupulously 
kept at bay, or put back to work as a productive myth of pluralism (Wollaeger 2008, 12). 
A third distinction opposed vertical and horizontal propaganda. The first corresponds to 
the classic understanding of propaganda as a top-down phenomenon directed at the 
masses. Horizontal propaganda can be defined as form of participatory propaganda, directed 
by members of a given group to foster the adherence from other members. The last 
distinction is made between rational and irrational propaganda. Rational propaganda rests on 
the communication of quantifiable and verifiable data (such as advertising the technical 
details of a machine) to persuade the audience. Irrational propaganda, on the other hand, 
relies on the manipulation of human emotion – something that, as Ellul notes, tends to be 
more noticeable. It therefore gives way to content that adheres more strictly to the trappings 
of rationality and factuality that, in turn, generate a more effective general impression after 
the finer details fade from memory (Ellul 1973b, 86). 
Since propaganda is a necessity in the technological society, both for the state and the 
individual, it would be wrong to see the public as “victim and prey.” Ellul considered that 
might be true for early forms of advertising, tasked with getting information across to 
consumers (1973b, 119). However, propaganda became an instrument for fulfilling needs of 
the state and the individual because it responds to sociological needs within the group: 
masses are required to participate in the political process, and the state needs to engage 
with that participation, constantly gauging public opinion and attitudes. Which is not to say 
that this process facilitates democratic expression; rather, it allows the state to pursue its 
functions by influencing the shaping of public opinion. Steering public opinion – 
“manufacturing consent,” in the words of Lippmann – is a core function in mass democracies. 
Propaganda is, then, a tool for state legitimation, for compliance with its form and decision at 
all times. Since it requires citizens to be mobilized to execute what are, fundamentally, 
technical decisions with little participation or public deliberation, the state creates, through 
propaganda, a permeating sense of informed consent. 
On the other hand, the individual needs propaganda to help him face his condition (Ellul 
1973b, 138). This condition is characterized by an outward defence of one’s own autonomy 
and independence, while actually an unconscious need is at work. Citizens cannot bear 
feeling powerless, but neither would they wish to make critical decisions: the modern 
individual needs to have a certain degree of information in order to function and participate. 
Information is often complex, hard to get or just too much for individuals to formulate 
autonomous judgements in a rapidly changing environment. For Curnalia, “propaganda 
offers the justifications individuals need… a sense of righteousness in complying… [and] 
crystallizes individuals’ opinions so that they reject alternative perspectives and ideas (2005, 
238). Jay Black adds that even a “fully functioning democratic society” cannot presume to 
work without propaganda, despite requiring pluralism, along with a critical and concerned 
media audience (2001, 135). 
 Hence, “[p]ropaganda succeeds only to the extent to which man is prepared to receive it, 
and where there is a sort of previous connivance between propagandist and propagandized” 
(Ellul 1975, 190 n. 9). By the effect of what is termed “the individual’s laziness,” messages 
need to include ready-made value judgements and coarse simplifications that allay the 
individual’s despair at having little control or supervision over decisions made by political and 
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technical elites (Ellul 1973b, 140). Propaganda hence helps to convey ideology and 
accelerates the processing of social information. As Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse 
concluded, this creates the illusion of freedom by limiting the available positions (and actions) 
within a given social system. In much the same way, entertainment masks the drudgery of 
routine: if “man is not automatically adjusted to the living conditions imposed on him by 
modem society” (Ellul 1973b, 143), then it is the task of news media and the culture industry 
to satisfy a passivity that may yet pass as informed consent – mainly by providing sanctioned 
escape paths in an increasingly routinized existence.  
Ellul saw propaganda as a pervasive phenomenon of the modern world, regardless of 
political regimes. As a technique of manipulation, it aims to build conditions of acceptance of 
reality, as well as to lay the principles of its further development (Ellul 1962, 174–177). In its 
narrow sense, propaganda “is defined by its institutional character. What defines it is a 
combination of techniques of psychological influence with the techniques of action-oriented 
organization and training” (Ellul 1962, 9).8 It can draw on pre-existing symbolic resources to 
structure its informational flows for efficient persuasion; traditional wisdom, trends and 
fashions, mass media and erudition are used as grounds for psychological action and 
warfare, as well as re-education and brainwashing (ibidem).  
Since the French philosopher was convinced that the colonizing character of modern 
technique percolated the behaviour of human beings, it is clear that propaganda plays an 
important part in Ellul's contrasting of economy and democracy. Propaganda needs to assert 
itself seamlessly in the cognitive lives of the public so that it can be effective. Its function is 
directly linked to the “tendencies of the technological society” (1962, 179), supplying self-
justification to the individual and the group in order to assure the organization of the political 
and economic world. As a predominantly symbolic and cultural phenomenon occurring 
through conscious and unconscious processes, propaganda replicates itself regardless of 
the specific means of dissemination. In behavioural terms, its effects can be seen as forms of 
normative and behavioural conditioning: psychological crystallization, alienation, dissociation, 
and dependency. The influence on psychic life is, for Ellul, an extension of the drive for 
efficiency, but now aimed at enacting activity changes. A non-instrumentalist form of 
propaganda is difficult to envision: insofar as it fulfils a role in the communication system of 
modern societies, propaganda is not entirely replaceable by traditional forms of information 
exchange and opinion formation, such as everyday conversation and assemblies, which lack 
mass reach. But nor must propaganda necessarily entail the reduction of communication to 
the instrumentalization of individual or social action.  
 Taking industrial methodologies as model, Ellul’s technique gradually becomes the most 
powerful force in society. Not as a specific disposition of contradictory social forces evolving 
throughout history, as Marx believed, but as a particular state or combination of technology 
and culture that achieved dominance as recently as the 20th century. Ellul saw technique as 
forcing the adaptation of society to its demands. In order to reach that goal, it sets forth an 
apparatus of strong “agents of adaptation” – among which we find propaganda and 
entertainment – that have become an integral part of a thoroughly organized society (Ellul 
2004, 322 ff.). The dependency on mediation is a critical factor and, as Langdon Winner 
concludes, the way out at the individual level is to restore “the validity of a person’s direct 
experience …, of inquiries and discussions that bring to focus the most basic questions 
about our shared existence and common commitments” (Winner 2013, 112). 
It is propaganda’s permanent masking that makes it hard to detect and analyse, especially 
in order to make a practical (not conceptual) distinction vis-a-vis information. The modern 
“psychopolitical universe” (Christians 1995) is permeated with messages that circle back and 
forth, redrawing the boundaries of the good life and defining conditions for existence and 
subsistence in the contemporary world. As Habermas, Ellul was concerned with the 
rationalization of choice and technocratic domination shrinking the territory of political 
                                                
8 Translated from the French edition. 
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deliberation.9 In other words, if we follow Ellul's reasoning on the mutually dependant 
economic and political systems, it is almost inevitable to regard public discourse as a self-
reinforcing feedback mechanism whose power grows through symbolic and technological 
means.  
4. The Construction of the Myths of Technique 
In Ellul’s framework, democracy, information, and technology are morally independent both 
as concepts and realities. Even though they often appear optimistically tied together, their 
value has been transferred to their representations, as signs that remain in place as means 
(for propaganda) after their loss of meaning on the path to current society models. By 
displacing knowledge and information to the realm of simulation and artifice, propagandistic 
practices perpetuate the myth of the necessary link between democracy, economic growth, 
and information.  
Baudrillard's later critique points to the same hollow space we have encountered in Ellul's 
thought: if the prevalence of information technology and consumer economics erodes the 
commonly posited connection between self and world, the theoretical re-establishment of 
stable categories is an extremely difficult task.10 This occurs because individual identity 
formation (profession, leisure, education, status) that translates into consumption (material or 
immaterial) feeds into the technical realm of economics, whereas a particularly well-informed 
and participating citizen is not relevant, either politically or economically. All that matters, in 
this sense, is organizing the symbolic sphere to ensure the decoding of the aspirations of the 
individual into the measurable material practices of the consumer-as-body that signal 
economic growth: exactly the kind of methodology that suits the technical system. 
In order to accomplish that, the symbolic realm needs to undergo a permanent 
refashioning: consumption as economic activity is tied to the creation and manipulation of 
meaning affixed to the affective world of mass consumption. The flow of consumption is 
ensured not only by responding to the needs, but also by allowing a great deal of plasticity of 
identity through the creation of desire – the saturation of the symbolic sphere with constantly 
changing and contradictory, i. e. meaningless, signs.11 This explains why Ellul viewed 
propaganda as an essential element of economic technique. However, Ellul's arguments can 
be seen as trapped in the same circular logic as the technological society itself. While 
acknowledging the existence of technique as an epistemic extension of the technological 
imperative – or, more precisely, of the progressive ideology that underlies the Enlightenment 
project – he does not contradict the fact that technoscience sustains people’s lives in the 
most straightforward sense, and that propaganda is embedded into socialization. 
In this section, Ellul’s linkage of propaganda with the processes of creation or exploitation 
of shared culture and of indoctrination will be further explored. Drawing on the contributions 
of authors that shared the concern with technocratic domination and technical thinking, I will 
look, first, into how they analysed that integration, and secondly, into how advertising 
positioned itself in that system as a technocratic tool for persuasion in the economic and 
                                                
9 In “Scientizaton of Politics and Public Opinion” (or. 1968), Habermas mentions Ellul as reference for the critique 
of the technocratic model of administration (1989a, 63 n. 2). He states that “technocratic administration of 
industrial society would deprive any democratic decision-making process of its object” (Habermas 1989a, 68).  
10 As Mark Poster points out in the introduction to his edition of a selection of Baudrillard's texts, “[t]he concurrent 
spread of the hyperreal through the media and the collapse of liberal and Marxist politics as master narratives, 
deprives the rational subject of its privileged access to truth. In an important sense individuals are no longer 
citizens, eager to maximize their civil rights; nor proletarians, anticipating the onset of communism. They are 
rather consumers, and hence the prey of objects as defined by the code” (1988, 7). This can be equated with 
Baudrillard's ulterior idea of a saturation of culture by “simulations” as a cynical instrumentalization of the cultural 
system of references. 
11 The goal of creating images of the good life through material goods is, in this sense, nothing short of a 
redefinition of cultural life, severing its ties with moral, political, or religious meaning. “[C]onsumer culture through 
advertising, the media, and techniques of display of goods, is able to destabilize the original notion of use or 
meaning of goods and attach to them new images and signs which can summon up a whole range of associated 
feelings and desires. The overproduction of signs and loss of referents […] is therefore an immanent tendency 
within consumer culture” (Featherstone 2007, 112). 
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political realms, a phenomenon fostered by a pervasive indoctrination system. This myth-
building and myth-exploiting system is then related to the emergence of a globalized 
consumerist technocracy based on digital networks. 
4.1. Ambivalent Technology: confronting Ellul and Marcuse  
Among the Frankfurt School’s theorists, it is Herbert Marcuse’s concern with technology and 
its effects on culture, his critique of technocratic ideologies and the myths of progress that 
share most of the scope of Ellul’s work on technology and propaganda. This subsection aims 
to explore some aspects of those similitudes but also major differences between them, such 
as are both suggested and clarified in mutual references.  
Ellul made numerous references to Marcuse, most of which are critical of the German 
author and show a fundamental divergence over the possibility of liberation from capitalist 
technocracy. In The Technological Bluff (1990), a convergence between the authors 
surfaced, specifically around the idea of technological ambivalence, that is, the open 
possibilities of positive and negative uses of technology that must not be confused with any 
form of technological neutrality (Ellul 1990, 38, 76). In The New Demons, Ellul again criticizes 
Marcuse for idealizing technology by investing it with the power to realize “egalitarian and 
democratic” goals once its “minor defects” have been corrected (1975, 115). This reference 
is, in fact, a critique of technological utopianism, especially when it is transformed into the 
optimistic outlook of its realization through democratic appropriation. Ellul sees this project as 
vague and poorly explained, degenerating on further “mythical thinking” (1975, 116). In the 
book The Ethics of Freedom, the French philosopher highlights the self-reinforcing, “self-
evident” beliefs that, stemming from technological complexity, impinge upon the human 
making it “a creature of external determination” (Ellul 1976b, 42). In the same passage, a 
footnote dismisses Marcuse’s analysis of the alienation problem without further comment 
(Ellul 1976b, n. 10). In both cases Ellul criticized Marcuse, charging him of wishing to 
transform modern society while maintaining industrial technology and methodologies as if the 
two were independent. Ellul insisted that modern technology is at odds with any truly 
democratic projects and, because Marcuse did not go far enough in his critique of the 
technological phenomenon, he seemed to be a reformer, rather than a revolutionary.12 
The Technological System is Ellul’s book that has the most references to Herbert 
Marcuse, and is the work most critical of Marcuse, although not in a detailed way. Thus, in 
two notes Ellul attacks One Dimensional Man as lacking in the analysis a focus on the 
autonomy of the technological phenomenon, overly focusing on contingent social structures 
and class relations (1980, 51, notes 5 and 6). Later in the same book, in other negative 
comments, Marcuse is brought to task for vagueness in his approach to the relation between 
politics and technology (1980, 156, n. 9), and for “complicating matters uselessly without 
contributing anything” with psychological terminology in One-Dimensional Man (1980, 327, n. 
10). 
For Ellul, Marcuse’s critique of capitalism also appears as still too focused on the role of 
the ruling classes, its appropriation of technique, and how new forms of authority might 
regain control of technology. Jacques Ellul was, as already noted, sceptical of the possibility 
of opening spaces of resistance within the sphere of technology. He ascribed propaganda an 
important role in the naturalization of alienation, that is, of creating internalized beliefs that 
prevented a real alternative from emerging. Because of that, he viewed technological 
appropriation and rationalization as an idealization of the democratic potential of technique. 
While Marcuse’s “theory leads to the conclusion that the derealized dimensions of art and the 
imagination must now be rejoined with real life through a completely new kind of scientific-
technical theory and practice” (Feenberg 1995, 32), Ellul proposed not a synthesis of 
                                                
12 This conceptualization is also what led Ellul to side with Habermas in his criticism of Marcuse (1989b) as overly 
optimistic with regard to the malleability of the relation between human, nature and technique (Ellul 1980, 169–
170, n. 8). This fundamental disagreement between the authors is further explored by Langdon Winner in 
Autonomous Technology, in which, by analysing Lenin’s technological policies, he stressed that the Ellulian idea 
of a loss of agency in the face of technocracy and its technological pragmatic efficiency does not depend on class 
power (1978, 260 ff).  
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technology and democracy, but a reconstruction of human relations with the world that would 
effectively erode technocratic thinking, and thus also reduce the alienating effect of 
propaganda. In other words, “unlike Marcuse, we are not looking at a socialist movement or 
revolution in any massive form, lest, according to Ellul, we risk falling back into the technical 
trap, but rather a revolution of a personal form which involves personal yet concrete actions. 
It is a clear yet difficult task – and all the more credible, in light of the Leviathan-like system 
of La Technique” (Holford and Saives 2013, 14). 
Even though Ellul engaged with Marcuse’s work, as shown, there was not a real dialogue 
between the authors. Douglas Kellner states that Herbert Marcuse repudiated any similarities 
with “autonomous technology” theory, despite not mentioning Ellul in his writings (Kellner 
1984, 266–7; 442 n. 7). Instead, Marcuse consistently emphasised emancipation through 
changes in the social control of industrial technology, as highlighted in his critique of Max 
Weber (Marcuse 1968). As his work progressed beyond One Dimensional Man, Marcuse 
identified the countercultural movements of the 1960s as important fractures in capitalist 
societies that gave reasons to be optimistic about radical social change. Marcuse’s approach 
to the problem of technological authority and domination places the instrumental ambiguity of 
technology as an opportunity for social change. The French author preferred an ethically 
grounded resistance to the technical system, refusing to ascribe technology a neutral role in 
the construction of freedom, while also entertaining very low hopes for radical mass 
movements that might reverse technical totality.  
In Alternative Modernity, Andrew Feenberg agrees that Herbert Marcuse “proposed the 
reconstruction of the technical base of society” (2010, 200). Feenberg states that “in drawing 
us into its orbit the system has exposed itself to new forms of resistance”, which demand the 
exploration of possibilities for political and individual action (1995, 2). In fact, the periodical 
emergence of alternative movements, and the liberating potential often assigned to new 
widespread technologies – particularly as the reach and scope of communication 
technologies has expanded in the last century – disprove the idea of a totalizing, closed 
society. In a sense, individuals and societies are permanently experimenting with 
sociotechnical arrangements that are not necessarily circumscribed by the technological 
system. Those ruptures offer – often missed – opportunities for reconstruction or change 
around shared social and cultural purposes that are disregarded in instrumental approaches 
to social relations. 
4.2. The Propaganda Technocracy 
Ellul places high relevance not only on social agency (technicians, capitalists, state), but also 
on the way the efficiency principle is widespread throughout organizations and social groups. 
This approach presents several important aspects that highlight its relevance. Firstly, Ellul 
avoids an elite theory underpinning by positing a dialectic process between social needs and 
elite intervention. While top-down propaganda constitutes a powerful force, horizontal or 
“social” propaganda, socialization and shared culture also embody persuasion systems. 
Dismissing these factors is to ignore Ellul’s decades-long questioning of the conditions that 
promoted this way of thinking to its current place. In the context of his view of technique, 
social and individual agencies are mutually constraining, but in an asymmetrical way.  
Second and related to the first reason, stating the power conditions and the network of 
elites is not sufficient, critically speaking, to explain the effectiveness of propaganda as 
technique. The interplay between ideology and praxis, between material and psychological 
needs, contributes to define the form of propaganda and the path of the technological society 
– technology is not the determinant factor. The very interdependence woven into the social 
system by the enabling character of technique makes it extremely hard to develop a practical 
philosophy that remains coherent both with humanistic morals and the fatalism of theoretical 
self-consciousness. As such, it is necessary to identify the motors of that interest (in Jowett 
and O’Donnell’s terminology, “institutions” and “propaganda agents”). For Ellul, 
“[p]ropaganda is effective not when based on an individual prejudice, but when based on a 
collective center of interest, shared by the crowds” (Ellul 1973b, 49).  
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A third reason is that Jacques Ellul emphasises the blurring of boundaries between 
economic, technological and political systems in the contemporary world, following with an 
appeal to shake off the thrall of the technological myths.13 As to the question of how it arose 
to its current position, however, Ellul attributed less importance to a major factor that was 
addressed by Marcuse and other critical theorists, namely the maintenance of capitalistic 
social relations and tensions with the transition to modern technology. As noted, Marcuse 
avoided an unimodal analysis (such as Heidegger’s or Ellul’s substantive view of 
technology), bringing to bear class relations, as well as the historical development of the 
capitalist modes of production as described by Marx and Weber in his work on technology 
(Kellner 2004, 5). That should not overshadow several points of convergence between Ellul 
and the work of critical theorists that often go unnoticed: the problematic emergence of the 
technological society in modernity (that is, a society driven by expertise, quantification and 
the “efficiency principle”), and the way “technique appears to be satisfying human needs and, 
in fact, is not doing so” (Sklair 1971, 221). Hence the importance of a philosophy of 
technology that is not overly focused on material technologies and also brings to bear expert 
processes and the ideology of technique as it permeates society: materiality is blended with 
social practices and analysing them as independent entities is an over-simplification.14 
Modern organizations, and particularly the large subsystems of public space such as the 
media or the State, have established themselves firmly in the realm of technique. In that 
territory, they contribute to the acceleration of consumerist drives by exercising tight controls 
over products, their representations and, most importantly, over the disciplinary regulation of 
the consumer’s body and life world. As Z. Bauman notes, “it is a condition of consumerism 
that the body is trained into a capacity to will and absorb more marketable goods, and that 
routines are instilled, through a self-inflicted drill” (1983, 41). 
Packard was one of the first professionals to expose the interlinking of advertising culture 
with the conditioning of behaviour, thought, practice and ideology at a mass scale – targeting 
the mass as citizens and as consumers. Its emergence occurred at a time when the 
expansion of consumerism and mass media pushed industries to expand their markets 
through the creation of needs, brands, and consumer loyalties. Vance Packard chose 
merchandisers (and marketers) as the object of his book The Hidden Persuaders.15 
Packard’s work was described as a “popular version of the Frankfurt school conspiratorial 
vision” (Wollaeger 2008, 11) and, indeed, it was a widely read exposé of the rise of 
professional promotional culture after World War II.  
In his book, Packard describes how professionals made it their job to understand 
fundamental drives individuals themselves did not know they had, mobilizing techniques from 
the study of political propaganda and the psychological sciences. In short, they became 
exploiters of the masses’ psyche. Their objectives were set by anyone with something to sell; 
subsequently, the plan of action was developed by technicians with the expertise to arouse 
the interest of the individual (as citizen and/or consumer) on any given product. By the late 
1950s, persuasion techniques had already reached strategic status as indispensable tools of 
the industrial system. On the background of its rise to prominence was the development of 
several areas of psychology and their convergence into what Packard refers to as “mass 
psychoanalysis” (1962, p. 11). Those new techniques were drawing on the study of the 
human mind and culture to exploit the shared symbolic world, the ‘culture codes’ (Rapaille 
2006), in order to mobilize them within consumer culture and mass politics.16 At the same 
time, the persuaders acted on a different, subliminal level of indoctrination which operated in 
                                                
13 Ivan Illich (1972) and E. F. Schumacher (1973) also emphasize the need to expose the utopian promises of the 
technological will as a complex of cultural effects. 
14 This is what Wanda Orlikowski designated as “constitutive entanglement,” a dynamic “sociomaterial 
assemblage” that provides a better object for studying technological practices (Orlikowski 2007, 1445). 
15 Packard's book was first published in 1957, only three years after Ellul originally published La Technique ou 
l'Enjeu du Siècle (The Technological Society). 
16 For example, the “selling” of a president needs to include a perspective on his personality invoking a father 
figure. No political candidate can forego extreme care, both with speech and physical appearance. 
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formal and informal education, preparing the individual for a life of immersion in consumerism 
and efficient production. 
For Vance Packard, persuasion was not limited to one aspect of everyday life. In his view, 
it aimed to create a form of ‘groupthink’ that eliminated the individual as autonomous subject. 
In politics, as in commercial advertising, massification and the global reach of electronic 
media gave rise to different kinds of persuasive techniques, tailored for democratic societies 
and influenced by “Pavlov and his conditioned reflexes, Freud and his father images, 
Riesman and his concept of modern American voters as spectator-consumers of politics and 
Batten, Barton, Durstine and Osborn and their mass merchandising lore” (Packard 1962, 
149–150).  
Vance Packard presented modern humans as being at risk of being defined, or 
manipulated, by a trend towards “other-mindedness, group living, and consumption-
mindedness” (1962, 192). This re-engineering would take place through the preparation of 
citizens, consumers and workers by the institutions of the industrial society. Behavioural 
studies generated the data that would later be used to adapt institutional architectures, in 
order to foster compliance and consent with ideological programs, usually under the guise of 
economic trends and planning. This transformation can indeed be best described as the 
institutional homogenization of the social body according to the industrial methods developed 
during the early 20th century.  
Packard’s book overstated the impact of propaganda and its scientific foundations, much 
like early media theories. In fact, Packard popularized the instrumentalist and substantive 
views on propaganda that dated back to the period between wars. What makes Packard still 
relevant is the way his discourse lingers on in popular views of propaganda as a basically 
top-down phenomenon, product of the machinations of expert technocracy. This view cannot 
be indefinitely sustained: without Ellul’s important qualifications of the needs and character of 
propaganda, it devolves into the mystification of technical efficiency we are trying to avoid. In 
spite of its shortcomings, the book is mentioned by Marcuse (in the Introduction to The One-
Dimensional Man, p. xlix) and Ellul (1975, 70, 146) as an important step towards awareness 
in its own time (the book was first published in 1957). Ellul agreed that the symbolic world of 
modern man – immersed in mass communication, social and horizontal propaganda – lends 
itself to instrumental uses. But he also warned that “[a]dvertisers do not manufacture the 
symbols” (Ellul 1975, 70). They select them for the reactions they can provoke and their 
potential to elicit action and change, as was made clear in Marcuse’s analysis of the scope 
and aims of Nazi propaganda. 
4.3. Hidden Persuasion and Indoctrination 
Nowhere is this systemic need for indoctrination more noticeable than in the persuasion 
industry. In the 20th century, especially after World War II, production capacity outstripped 
demand and economic resources, threatening to cause a new economic crisis. Part of the 
solution was to flood the public symbolic space with representations of a good life 
represented by readily available mass-produced goods. According to Ellul, in order to be 
successful, this process required a previous work of indoctrination, that is, a sensitising to 
those representations of life in the modern world that produces a form of alienation. 
Ellul remarked that this sensitization had religious echoes. He considered that symbolism 
and its exploitation by advertising draws on the mechanisms of religious thinking, turning it 
into the “orphic delirium of consumption” (Ellul 1975, 146) through the “will to believe” in the 
strong, simple messages of technological myth (Ellul 1973b, 40).17 This indoctrination in the 
sacred powers of technology to free humanity and empower the individual towards a supra-
human condition is transparent in popular culture.  
But the individual is born in an alienating environment. Ivan Illich draws on Jacques Ellul 
as he underlines that pervasive mobilization and its long-term manipulative effects in 
Deschooling Society. In the wake of Ellul, Ivan Illich was one of the most powerful critiques of 
                                                
17 That aspect contradicted theories of media effects, which relied on behavioural models, and finds echoes in 
Baudrillard’s work on simulation and Debord’s thoughts on the spectacle. 
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the pervasiveness of industrial rationalism in institutional practices: school, hospital, etc. His 
work provides an alternative view which follows Ellul’s view of the role of individual moral 
autonomy. 
 Illich points out some misunderstandings in the integrationist or progressive discourse 
that regards ICT (information and communication technology) as part of a desirable and 
constant technological progress. Information technology, the myth goes, would restore 
citizens' control of the production and consumption cycle, relieving the masses of some of 
their cognitive burden. At the same time, the penetration of ICT in the scientific and social 
milieus would accelerate organizational, managerial, and epistemic processes, broadening 
the realm of technology into the foundations of matter and information.18 
Although information technology could be materialized as “convivial tools” (Illich 1973, 
65),19 they are integral to the hegemonic industrial system. As such, ICT are charged by what 
Illich claimed to be a loss or degrading change in community language, linked to the role of 
media as vehicles of transmission of mass messages spread by centralized structures – 
even in the case of the purportedly decentralized new media. The concept of “conviviality” is 
central to understanding alternative forms of production and consumption, but it is not a 
strictly economic concept. Its critical dimension implies social and cultural aspects:  
 
I choose the term “conviviality” to designate the opposite of industrial 
productivity. I intend it to mean autonomous and creative intercourse among 
persons, and the intercourse of persons with their environment; and this in 
contrast with the conditioned response of persons to the demands made 
upon them by others, and by a man-made environment. I consider 
conviviality to be individual freedom realized in personal interdependence 
and, as such, an intrinsic ethical value (Illich 1973, 11, emphasis added). 
 
This implies that the limits to the convivial potential of new technologies reside in the current 
economic structure or, more generally, in the technological system. The author reproaches 
the efficiency principle and technical rationalization adopted by modern organizations in 
similar terms as Ellul and Marcuse. The main concern is the closing of the horizon for action. 
For example, the aims of the “hidden curriculum” in education and learning are to maximize 
the efficiency of human resources in order to provide the industrial structure with all the 
means necessary for their maintenance and expansion (Illich 1972, 106). This standard is 
deployed as an institutionalization of efficiency values, for which the school system (a rather 
revealing expression) becomes a hegemonic instrument: “[a] society committed to the 
institutionalization of values identifies the production of goods and services with the demand 
for such. (...) School is the advertising agency which makes you believe that you need the 
society as it is” (Illich 1972, 163).  
As Adorno and Horkheimer explained in The Concept of Enlightenment, “Enlightenment’s 
program was the disenchantment of the world. It wanted to dispel myths, to overthrow 
fantasy with knowledge” (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002, 1).	  Some of the shortcomings of the 
Aufklärung project stem from the inability, or impossibility, to eradicate the 
instrumentalization of mythical thinking in legitimation by infusing the education and political 
systems with critical rationality. Instead, education came to be perceived as one more source 
of domination: “[t]he most effective propaganda combines entertainment, education and 
persuasion. The entertainment elements attract the audience, while the educational aspect 
decreases the perception that the message is propaganda, even as it persuades” 
                                                
18 Within this framework, emerging technologies (including ICT, nanotechnology, biotechnology, cognitive science 
and technology) are not truly revolutionary, but a continuation of progressively sophisticated industrial methods 
(Alves 2013). 
19 According to Illich's Tools for Conviviality “[c]onvivial tools are those which give each person who uses them the 
greatest opportunity to enrich the environment with the fruits of his or her vision. Industrial tools deny this 
possibility to those who use them and they allow their designers to determine the meaning and expectations of 
others. Most tools today cannot be used in a convivial fashion” (Illich 1973, 22, emphasis added). 
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(Macdonald 2006, 32). As conveyors of symbolic and cultural representations, the media and 
the school system instil the values that circulate in the sociocultural environment and shape 
the individual's double role of citizen as consumer by conditioning responses at a social scale 
(eliciting a “general attitude”), that is, through the “elimination of individualizing factors” (Ellul 
1973b:302). In brief, Illich, Ellul and critical theorists converged in considering that the 
individual was diminished, and her capacity for critique and self-reflection discouraged 
throughout her institutional path in centralized organizations. Additionally, this process is self-
reinforcing, in that it continually creates new needs and new dependencies. 
4.4. The Protean Citizen / Consumer 
For Vance Packard, this submissive adaptation, created by a system of influence and 
persuasion deeply ingrained in governments and industry already in the 1950s, had the 
explicit purpose of “[m]oulding 'team players' for free enterprise” (Packard 1962, 165). The 
American writer contrasted the new value given to an “orwellian groupthink” (idem) over the 
traditional brand of individualism. He also established a distinction between two sorts of 
manipulation. The first aimed “to achieve the constructive purpose of making employees 
happier and more effective at their jobs” by offering them symbolic (status-related) rewards 
(Packard 1962, 171). The second kind of manipulation used psychological techniques and 
tests to “assess and remould management men” (Packard 1962, 175), which included 
intelligence and psycho-technical tests as well as attitudes toward authority, dignity, and 
family life. Every single assessment was carried out against a background of corporate 
interests (profit, efficiency, flexibility, loyalty) and other systemic values, such as patriotism. 
As we have seen, the introduction of the industrial mode of production is not an isolated 
event, but rather a planned, ordered, restructuring of cultural and organizational values. What 
is at stake is the end of autonomy, replaced by heteronomic values. Modernization 
processes have a broad impact, relying on propaganda and consumption, centralization of 
power, and organization, all determined to a varying extent by the technological form. The 
institutionalization of daily practices leads to a blurring of the public sphere and citizenship, 
giving rise to an increasing dependence on the “industrial” system. 
Each new crisis, be it economic or political, is brought up against this background of 
technical demands placed upon the individual. Consumerism itself is never called into 
question, except insofar as it can be subject to a new discipline dictated by technique. 
Recent examples from Southern Europe show how the financial crisis was used to put on 
hold even procedural notions of democratic participation, prioritizing the technical-minded 
readjustment of society to the demands of the globalized economy (reminding us again of 
Ellul’s remark about the “anti-democratic economy”). Disciplined consumption is the 
indispensable base of economic growth, to be stimulated when it slows down too much, and 
regulated when it threatens macroeconomic balances. Citizenship is important only as the 
source of legitimation of political options – in political discourse, “citizen” is often equated 
with “taxpayer,” signalling an economic criterion of exclusion from the political sphere.  
In fact, according to Zygmunt Bauman, the inevitability of exclusion of all who lack the 
resources to participate in the consumption economy – the jobless, the debtors, or the “new 
poor” – is inherent to reduction of the human life world to the quantifiable, tradable, and 
profitable (2007). For all intents and purposes, the non-consumer is part of an “underclass” of 
“fallen consumers” that have no access to the good life of accelerating consumption and, 
therefore, are placed in the symbolic territory of the non-citizen (Bauman 2007, 32). 
Illich believed that one of the solutions to the serious problems and inequalities in our 
societies rests on the re-establishing of "natural scales and limits" (Illich 1973, xii), to remedy 
the imbalances evident in industrialized societies and returning them to a “multidimensional 
balance of human life" (Illich 1973, xi). He concludes that civil society is in danger of 
disappearing with the extension of institutionalization. The persistence of the expansion of 
the production and consumption cycle as measure of quality of life raises increasing doubts 
about the sustainability of the global consumer society, as resource scarcity strains the ability 
to develop new technological solutions. 
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For Ellul, this is the most salient problem with the alliance between technique and the 
symbolic world that propaganda represents: it locks human beings in a cycle of social and 
psychological dependence from the totalizing system that engulfs modern existence. The 
denial of possible alternatives is the main target of Ellul’s outrage against consumer 
capitalism, and the propagandistic apparatus of economic technique. Ellul was by no means 
alone in perceiving the encroachment of economics in the political sphere, nor in decrying 
the limiting of freedom through this colonization of the public sphere. More recently, Daniel 
Miller highlighted the consequences of that process: the past political divisions between left 
and right, once united by the rejection of consumption as “political activity,” have been 
superseded by an unquestioned compliance with economic models where the management 
of consumer activity (including consumer groups) plays an important role, that is, “modern 
politics has become a mere dependant of modern economics” (Miller 1995, 2). 
This systemic perspective on propaganda, technology and consumption incorporates 
important observations on the organization of modern societies. Firstly, it integrates 
propaganda and consumption as factors in the economic system, showing how they 
participate in the promotion of efficiency in all sectors of society. Secondly, it shows how the 
technological and economic systems appropriate the symbolic world and, through 
socialization, refashion it into a flexible control mechanism. Thirdly, it highlights the 
dependency of the economic and political systems on the communication structure of 
modern societies. 
5. Retracing Propaganda in the Information Age: The Example of Security and 
Cyber Politics 
As the history of propaganda shows, it is not just amusement – entertainment, infotainment, 
leisure – that provides a path for propaganda and persuasion in favour of technology. While it 
is true that the culture industry ensures symbolic production and its circulation to and from 
the masses, there remains a more acute factor in what may be called the system of public 
opinion in the information age. It concerns the control of the infrastructure, along with the 
content, of information exchanges. This section is an overview of the current ideologically-
laden framing of arguments for stronger securitization of cyberspace, i. e., for more state and 
corporate control over the global digital telecommunication infrastructure and contents. It 
intends to reflect upon the colonization of cyberspace as an instance of the extensional logic 
of technical thinking, control and domination, and how propaganda helps that process by 
mobilizing myths congregating both individual and social needs. 
Considering the importance of information management in the administration of means 
towards economic ends, questions arise concerning information networks and its role in our 
globalized economies. How will technological politics shape the development of digital 
networks? Will their democratic potential be emphasised? Or will they be regulated as 
commercial territories? Both as  economic and communicational milieu, digital networks have 
risen into prominence, first as the locus of a new myth, promising the utopia of generalized 
connectivity and concord, then as the hyped realm of economic opportunities (ravaged by 
financial cycles of bursting bubbles), and now as a de-territorialized space of conflict. Digital 
networks, and especially the Internet, embody the strife, signalled by Ellul and Illich, between 
a civic symbolic sphere and techno-economic imperatives. As seen above, Ellul highlighted a 
dialectical construction of propaganda and social myth. He considered that the technological 
society was founded upon the efficiency principle and its extension to all areas of human 
existence. That hegemonic character depended on acceptance, compliance and adaptation 
– the purposes of propaganda. Ellul also pointed out, as critical theorists, that systematic 
propaganda was a response to the complexity of the modern world.  However, as Herman 
and Chomsky discussed, it reinforces the current status quo and power relations and, in 
itself, reveals the links between economic power, politics, and importance of shaping public 
opinion. Illich added a stronger emphasis on indoctrination and adaptation to what he termed 
“industrial methodologies” which, in his view, were in the process of being augmented by a 
“computerized Leviathan” (1974, 5), that is, information technologies.  
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Disasters and risks are effective catalysts for mobilization. The sense of urgency in a time 
of crisis is a powerful tool for behavioural conditioning, and it has been “engineered” several 
times in the history of propaganda. Hearst used his media empire to build up to the Spanish- 
American War. The Lusitania incident, the Pearl Harbor and 9/11 attacks, among many 
others, produced effects that were amplified by mass media, transformed into rallying words 
for the intensification of conflicts in and out of battlefields. One of the most important aspects 
of politics in our time is the use of disasters as catalysts for propaganda. Either real – 
technological catastrophes, natural and humanitarian disasters, wars – or in the form of 
moral panics, they are purposefully used as occasions for intensifying efforts for behavioural 
change. Naomi Klein presented this phenomenon as the doctrine of disaster capitalism, or 
“shock doctrine:” an acceleration of political, social and economic programmes in the wake of 
natural, man-made or engineered upheaval (Klein 2007).  In the same way, ‘digital disaster 
propaganda’ (under the guise of warnings of a ‘digital Pearl Harbor’) for example, helps the 
extension of technical rationalism and consumerism, as well as the spread of centralized 
control over digital networks. It presents cybersecurity as social need, a field where only a 
technical apparatus can succeed in restoring stability. The promises of a democratic 
cyberspace (or of cyberspace as tool for democracy) have been overshadowed by the 
promises of technique as security. While information technologies have been hailed for its 
emancipatory and decentralizing potential, new risks and threats developed new challenges 
to the online ecosystem. Today, responses to these threats have reframed the status of the 
digital sphere as a locus of conflict, the more extreme form of which – the development of 
cyber warfare capabilities – can be seen as a military colonization of cyberspace. 
5.1. Dystopia and Myths: Virtual Enemies and Cyber Warfare 
During the Cold War, the possibility of destruction of the military chain of command 
established the need to create a resilient network to decentralize communication structures. 
After a golden era of unfettered expansion, the Internet is now reverting to the normative 
structuring of a controlled space, albeit commercial instead of military. As information and 
communication technologies developed and converged onto digital networks, its strategic 
character re-emerged in a bifurcated pattern.   
On the one hand, there is a persistent belief in the political potential of network 
technologies, which maintains that they have a liberating and individuating potential which 
will ensure a “democratic rationalization” (Bakardjieva and Feenberg 2002) and allow the 
emergence of a generalized, communitarian critical stance towards technology. This view 
adopts the idea of the emergence of spaces of openness with the technological system and 
dominant propaganda. If those spaces can be used to promote a new form of social 
construction, it would also be possible to revert some of the negative effects of technology 
and propaganda. 
On the other hand, networks themselves became a matter of political and economic strife, 
where numerous institutional, communitarian and other more or less anarchic groups vie for 
control. The Internet and the networked environments it sustains – government, military, 
business, entertainment, news, social networking services – have entered diplomacy and the 
political spotlight as a new sort of battlefield. This view suggests that it is an area to be 
regulated and securitized in order to isolate and eliminate threats to economically vital 
information exchanges, as highlighted by the US Secretary of State: 
 
Governments and citizens must have confidence that the networks at the core of 
their national security and economic prosperity are safe and resilient. Now this is 
about more than petty hackers who deface websites. Our ability to bank online, 
use electronic commerce, and safeguard billions of dollars in intellectual property 
are all at stake if we cannot rely on the security of our information networks 
(Clinton 2010).  
 
By reducing Internet freedom to commercial activity, entertainment and opposing it to 
terrorism, censorship, espionage and organized crime, institutional actors are, once again, 
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establishing a frontier. This is a propagandistic move that normalizes certain uses of 
technology and hyperbolically defines threats to ‘condoned’ activities. In other words, this 
kind of discourse frames Internet freedom within what Herman and Chomsky have defined 
as “faith in the market,” thereby creating rules within which ‘the market’ can operate with 
minimal disruption. But this form of Internet freedom discourse also creates an enemy, or 
“faces of evil:” hackers, cyberspies, whistleblowers. By reducing dissent to criminal activity, 
espionage, and sabotage, it fits squarely into a form of propaganda that exalts the economic 
or even emancipatory potential of the Internet, while also defining patterns of acceptable 
uses and behaviour.  
The mythical envelopment of new information technologies has undergone a multi-
directional, chaotic growth that asserted the networks' roles as catalysts and databases, 
supported to the point of near-ubiquity by myriad devices. To posit any hard ethical stance in 
such a dynamic technological environment leads to reductionist dead ends, not least 
because of the entanglement of world-views that coexist on the Internet (Mosco 1998). The 
networked utopia of communication has been replaced by another myth: that of the Internet 
as battlefield. The time for peaceful coexistence of conflicting perspectives, if there ever was 
one, seems to be over. In sum, this new discourse aims to establish a deterritorialized non-
border of nation-states bent on economic mobilization to maintain geopolitical leadership. Of 
course, this also includes using the network as an agent of adaptation, or as a conduit 
thereof. Power shifts are played out as virtual warfare, either as diplomacy, or in new forms 
of low-intensity conflicts over intellectual property and disruptions of organizational 
processes. 
Jeffrey Carr defines cyber-warfare as “the art and science of fighting without fighting; of 
defeating an opponent without spilling their blood” (2009, 2), an aim as ancient as war itself. 
Paraphrasing C. H. Gray, Neal Curtis states that “there are three central elements to cyber 
warfare. The first is the belief that it can be managed scientifically; the second is the belief 
that war is a matter of information and interpretation; the third is the emphasis on computers 
as the means by which the first and the second elements will be achieved” (Curtis 2006, 139, 
emphasis added). These elements are part of a theorization of postmodern war as a new 
technological myth of sanitized conflict. The inherent uncertainties of war are presented as 
minimized, first, through a phenomenological conversion of the physicality of the battlefield 
into massive informational pools, and, second, through a migration of high-intensity conflict 
into cyberspace, under the guise of propagandistic actions, industrial espionage and 
information controls.  
These are signs of trouble for the network variety of techno-utopians. A 2011 OECD 
report stated that current doctrines, terminologies and policies are responding to a hyperbolic 
sense of urgency that does not correspond to a real systemic risk (Sommer and Brown 2011, 
5–8). The authors stress the need to look beyond fears and propaganda (that is, perceived 
threats and risks) in order to understand the extent to which institutional actors need to 
implement cyber-security measures. In fact, governments and international organisms are 
increasingly worried about network safety. The President of the United States of America has 
unveiled various plans for national and international cyberspace strategies (The White House 
2009; 2011; The White House and National Security Council 2011), in the wake of several 
civilian and military initiatives aimed to increase readiness against threats of cyber-attacks on 
infrastructure, services, institutions and companies – themselves being met by diplomatic 
actions since 2009. Besides this new cyber war political positioning, there are also signs of 
the preparation of complete strategic and tactical frameworks by the United States’ 
Department of Defense and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.   
As the Internet is transformed into the locus of sabotage, propaganda and a permanent 
struggle for valuable information, the outlook becomes less favourable to the democratization 
in online governance. These developments signal a new stage of maturity of the virtual world 
– namely, its colonization by nation-states. On one hand, it is a normative colonization: it 
presents a view of cyberspace and a set of sanctioned (shopping, commercial entertainment, 
news, business) uses vis-à-vis a number of undesirable or ‘unsafe’ uses (file sharing, political 
activism, information disclosure).  On the other hand, it has a strong military component. This 
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effort is a complement to the geostrategic positioning of state and non-state actors that have 
taken the initiative. In brief, it reveals a willingness to exploit the generalized connectivity of 
globalized societies (Payne 2009, 110–111).  
The development of cyber warfare and digital espionage capabilities represents additional 
dimensions of the current creation of a heavily controlled cyberspace.  The drive for the 
development of cyber-weapons came from the perceived need to defend strategic assets 
and to protect freedom in the online environment, while also using that medium to spread 
information and collect intelligence.20 Meanwhile, the hopes for a cosmopolitan technology – 
a self-organized, self-regulated, and commercialized Internet – were definitely exposed as 
the re-enactment of similar, earlier myths related to other communication technologies 
(Latouche 2006).  
5.2. Myths of Progress and Innovation as Systems of Propaganda 
A social myth is a powerful image. It describes the aspirations and values of a social group, 
creating a norm, objectives, or guidelines for action. It also integrates a given set of 
representations which are widely circulated and used within that social group. As 
O’Shaughnessy defined, 
 
 A myth may be described as a story or event that illuminates the key values of 
some society or association: the events can be real or imaginary, but, almost 
certainly, imagination will have embroidered them. The propagandist, thus, draws 
from the existing stock of social mythologies as well as adding to them 
(O’Shaughnessy 2004, 88).  
 
Propaganda is central to this new sphere of spectacular simulations. The myths of alterity 
and difference compound the technological myths, themselves a combination of higher-order 
representations of wealth and power through material progress. Insofar as digital 
communication technologies partake in both these fields, they also become vulnerable to 
instrumentalization and propaganda efforts.  
The most powerful myth of the modern age presents history as a linear process of 
amelioration in the conditions of the existence of humankind. Science and technology are 
seen as the driving forces of the betterment of the human condition. Industrial methods, 
themselves related to historicist ideologies of progress, exacerbate the risks of the extension 
of a single method to all areas of human activity in a process of generalized rationalization. 
According to Illich (and Ellul, as previously stated), the institutions of the nation-state were 
inspired by the industry and its methods: education, health, army, transportation and 
communications follow the organizational paradigm of the factory and perpetuate its 
methodologies (Illich 1972).  
For Ellul, technique as a system depends on the ability to accelerate and streamline 
information exchanges. In fact, planning and forecasting have become increasingly harder 
(Ellul 2004, 298ff). As new technological forms emerge, and with them more sophisticated 
products and methods to master, adapting the existing structures is more than a 
competitiveness problem: it is a matter of systemic continuity. ICT, in particular, are put in 
place as a synthesis of technique, reunifying the plurality of elements and functions of the 
technological systems already in place. The general drives for automation, of efficient 
production, alongside the increased efficiency in distribution, marketing, and organization, 
underline the importance of the management of abundance through information processing – 
an idea encapsulated in Henri Lefebvre’s expression “bureaucratic society of managed 
consumption” (Lefebvre 1996, 147). Ivan Illich referred to the resulting system as the 
“computerized Leviathan” (1974, 5). Propaganda, as part of the technological system, has 
taken the task of adapting societies to this new paradigm, “seducing” and “tempting” (Van der 
Laan 2004) individuals with the power of disembodied access. 
                                                
20 An example of which is the Stuxnet worm, which allegedly played a part in bringing Iran's nuclear program to a 
temporary standstill by disabling an important part of its machinery. 
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At the local and global level, information can cross the globe instantly through direct 
reports and second-hand repetitions. The importance of this flow cannot be overstated: 
transparency in political and economic matters is a pillar of democracy and should be central 
to a society that values citizenship (Schudson 2008). The quality of individual participation in 
public affairs depends on an ethical, active stance towards all dimensions of life. Mass and 
digital media can contribute to either foster or impair transparent practices (they are 
characteristically ambivalent, as propaganda studies have shown). Some of the limits to the 
perceived emancipatory potential of digital networks stem from the interventions of nation-
states in the cyber sphere, precisely in the form of security initiatives (the latest examples 
coming, in 2013, from the revelations about widespread electronic surveillance). The 
promotion of digital democracy and global online commerce notwithstanding, it is possible 
that the denial of resources or the surveillance of political action in cyberspace plays an 
important role in those interventions. 
In order to overcome Ellul's admonition and to be in accordance with the stated principles 
of democracy, an informed citizen would need to access accurate, relevant information. 
Ideally, this need would be answered by efficient communication systems, populated by 
professional and technicians that produce and relay that information. However, the 
international, relatively centralized, property structure of mass media and their large financial 
stakes, make them reluctant to take the risks that inhere in being the counter-power 
unravelling propaganda's systematic, instrumental approach to the symbolic sphere. On the 
contrary, the permanent search for new ways to attract audiences is at odds with such task. 
For this reason, digital communication networks may have introduced some degree of 
counter-balancing democracy. But, as noted, a backlash against the open possibilities of 
digital communication has been forming, as cyberwarfare, new regulations and pervasive 
surveillance transform the ideological landscape by way of appeals to security, control and 
limits to access. This has highlighted the susceptibility of the digital ecosystem to the effects 
of direct and indirect propaganda, as well as of direct intervention, and suggests that Ellul’s 
critical outlook of the possibilities of emancipation within the technological realm is accurate. 
Democracy and consumption are part of the ideological structure of the new cyber-utopia. 
“Contemporary propaganda implies that technological improvements within information 
society will ultimately lead to the arrival of the perfect state in which all desires of consumers 
will be fulfilled” (Karim 2001, 118). Not only does that discourse depend on a difficult to prove 
correlation between democracy and information, but it also invokes the allure of the Edenic 
myth of painless progress towards wealth and well-being. Investing ICT with the garments of 
emancipation is equivalent to the deliberate production of a strategic economic asset which 
is also the locus of a morally charged claim of participatory citizenship. The underlying praxis 
requires individuals and nations to enter a kind of hermeneutic relationship with technologies, 
though opposed to the humanistic enlightenment which Ellul advocated. The goal would be 
the creation of a code to allow the actualisation of the promise of technique, both in the 
producer's life and in society as a whole. Here, innovation is rhetorically construed as the 
path to utopia because of its hypothetical potential to mobilise individuals and groups for the 
task of closing the gap between the political, economic and technical systems. Something 
that Ellul and Illich rejected as a mirage ascribable to functional distortions of the organic, 
evolving macro-system of technique, as already noted. 
6. Conclusion 
The framework of propaganda studies has not lost its relevance. Although communication 
studies have paid less attention to propaganda analysis after the end of the Cold War and as 
scientific theories favoured effects and uses of media and technologies, a new look might be 
in order. In fact, the early mythologizing of new media, which focused on discontinuities, has 
not yet given way to an inquiry into the continuities of its symbolic role in the communication 
sphere. New media seem to be fertile ground to exacerbated hopes for democracy and 
participation, but also a potent vehicle for propaganda messages. Digital communication 
networks are often credited with changing the paradigm for communication, but more effort 
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needs to be made towards a convergence of approaches in order to analyse comparatively, 
as well as historically, the messages and ideological content of the encompassing 
articulation of technique and culture. 
Ellul’s contribution to propaganda studies may now be appreciated in a different light. 
Other propaganda definitions fail to account for the effectiveness of social myths, mainly by 
assuming a vertical, top-down structure of message dissemination with high impact, while 
overlooking horizontal and social propaganda. In fact, mass media are not the sole driving 
force, although it is impossible to deny their crucial role in the professionalization of 
propaganda. The Herman and Chomsky propaganda model accounts for the logic of 
privatization that forces a closing of public communication around capitalist elites. There is 
no reason to believe it is not applicable to the transition to online media (which shifted 
financing flows to targeted advertising and e-business in general, but maintained the 
economic links between media and corporation).  
Another important aspect of technological transition is the logic of extension of the 
propaganda and technical systems. According to the Frankfurt School theorists, this 
configuration was an all-encompassing system that assimilated its counterparts while 
“working around” its contradictions through innovation and the mobilization towards 
consumption, against a background of glorification of technical progress. This ‘methodology’, 
when applied to current trends in information politics, translates into a normative colonization 
that established a hegemonic myth for cyberspace: an insecure sphere that needs to be 
controlled and treated as a territory of struggle in order to avoid chaos and unpredictability. 
Ellul’s horizon – as a philosopher, social thinker and a Christian believer – was to highlight 
individual moral autonomy. Technique invites the individual, as citizen and consumer, to 
accompany its myths of progress and technological bliss by submitting to the principle of 
efficiency. Propaganda plays a major role in that mobilization. However, even as it helps 
making sense of the modern world, it places human beings in the position of dependency 
that further reduces the individual’s autonomy. If modernization requires such a degree of 
conformity and standardization, then the role of propaganda is to keep dissent, non-
conformity or alternatives at a minimum, and in the most marginal position possible in all 
social arenas. It is, in fact, a matter of conserving and concentrating social resources within 
the logic of technique. 
The transition from traditional to modern societies has been, mainly, the result of technical 
amendments to nature, opening up possibilities for action over the natural and the social 
worlds. Its implementation, however, created social and political problems. Even when used 
to carry out identical or similar tasks, propaganda actions, resource exploitation, automation, 
and technical bias in education amplify, instead of merely replacing, social and cultural gaps, 
thereby countering the very existential practices and conditions of human autonomy that 
made their emergence possible after the Enlightenment. Technique does not make 
distinctions between means and ends, nature and society. In fact, it connects them tightly, 
and in no point in history more evidently so than after information technology accelerated the 
unification of the technical system. 
Propaganda and mythologies of the connected self and society have reached an 
unparalleled intensity. This has led to a hyped discourse that pays little heed to the 
concerned arguments this paper analyses. Recent developments – such as the consecutive 
cyber-attacks on companies and governments, the WikiLeaks cases and corporate reaction, 
the actions of the hacker group Anonymous, the race for Internet kill switches – have shown 
that the virtual world built over our informational infra-structure is not exempt from controls 
and limitations. The Internet is as much a disputed economic asset as a vehicle for symbolic 
exchanges. It is a medium (or several media tied together), but also a disembodied territory 
of strife and domination. In that sense, it is a perfect metaphor for an age when identity and 
sociability are turned into the hidden objects of persuasion. 
Jacques Ellul believed that the desire for efficiency and positivistic scientific credibility 
gave rise to new elites, different from the engaged public intellectuals of the humanist liberal 
arts tradition, and more committed to private gain. The media and learning institutions that 
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shouldered the responsibility of safeguarding the human spirit against its instrumentalization, 
have fallen prey to the technological system’s catering to ambition.  
As I tried to show, Jacques Ellul's arguments have not lost validity. As Marcuse’s, Ellul’s 
work poses a daunting question: why should technology, an integral part of being human and 
living in the world, be reduced to an aggressive, destructive force, an end unto itself? Why 
should technological fixes take the place of rational debate over the fundamental goals of 
human life and the ways to pursue it? For the citizen, a lightning rod for influence and 
persuasion, it is increasingly clear that most roles, in the private and public spheres, have 
been constrained into strict consumer models. Democratic representation underpinned by 
technique as administrative and control tools shows evident signs of capture by commercial 
and military interests, with too little accountability. Overlooking the modern societal need for 
propaganda and wishing for a reversal of its pervasiveness are not viable options. Instead, 
the sources and purposes of propaganda can be addressed from critical and moral 
standpoints as promoting instrumentalization and domination, and exposed as such. As the 
previous analysis made clear, Ellul is sceptical regarding the possibility of overcoming 
technocratic propaganda, due to its central role in the fulfilment of technological 
instrumentality and efficiency.  
A degree of disentanglement from the monism of technique – the coupling of technocracy 
and propaganda, in this case – can be achieved if the individual is conscious of his exposure 
to persuasion techniques and acts to counter them. Alternative progressive emancipatory 
politics can counteract propaganda and serve social needs instead of imposing the 
heteronomous goals of exploitative technocratic systems upon society. To extricate oneself 
from the propaganda system is a critical, reflexive undertaking: it requires acknowledging the 
role of propaganda, understanding how it operates through shared culture and symbols 
(including education systems and socialization), and unveiling the purposes of the 
propagandist.  
This reflexive individualistic focus, evocative of the anti-propaganda education of the 
interwar period, is very strong in Ellul. However, it would give only a small hope for an 
alternative since it relies on personal enlightenment, suggesting an ethical awakening, rather 
than critical political action. A society without propaganda being impossible to achieve, 
especially if we take into account the link between social needs and the purpose of 
propaganda, Ellul’s hope resides in the possibility of transformative action, enacted in 
constructive relationships with others in everyday life – collective action grounded in 
individual responsibility and reflexive autonomy.  
This would open additional methods to design a progressive social program of 
disentanglement that subverts the capture of public communication. To emancipate a group 
from propaganda would require a convivial reworking of identity, that is, a form of 
socialization based on new relationships. This ‘counter-ideal’, that is, the confluence of 
autonomous individuals sharing a non-instrumental approach to social relations and 
communication, would demand not only pluralistic communication channels permeating 
society, including the online channels currently under siege, but also a reversal of the ‘human 
techniques’ that produce and manage the modern individual as consumer and disciplined 
citizen. Thoroughly pluralistic economic and political systems can only emerge when 
centralized forms of technocratic governance have been not only deconstructed, but 
replaced at the societal level.  
Jacques Ellul’s work remains relevant, but unfinished. Almost a century of technology and 
communication studies, and an era of prosperity for developed countries, were largely 
framed by advances in science and technology. However, it is debatable whether the political 
sphere has survived the onslaught of specialization, or if it has, as the French philosopher 
feared, morphed into a dramatized simulation of discursive practices where only the myth of 
public deliberation and participation remains. In sum, between the technological system and 
democracy, the former has taken the lead, and the need for a critical disentanglement of the 
two has never been greater. 
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